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Abstract 
 Recently, the government of Bangladesh announced the launch of Vision–2041, a 
policy-based plan for the realization of Bangladesh a  a prosperous and developed country. 
However, policymakers identified two important but somewhat incompatible challenges 
to the work to realize Vision-2041: ensuring rapid but stable economic growth, and 
reducing poverty. Towards rapid and stable economic growth, the government of 
Bangladesh began reforming the public sector, which is responsible for the preparation 
and implementation of government policies. Towards the reduction of poverty, the 
government promoted improvement of the productivity of the agriculture sector by 
introducing crop diversification and new technologies.  
 This dissertation presents case studies of two initiatives taken to develop effective 
policies to meet the above two challenges. In the first case study (chapter 2), the effect of 
implementation of a reform policy (the 2015 pay scale reform) is examined in terms of 
improvement of selection and recruitment for the Bangl desh Civil Service (BCS). The 
second case study (chapter 3) examines the effectiveness of incentives for improving the 
performance of extension agents in the public agricultural extension service of 
Bangladesh.  
 Chapter 2 examines the effect of the 2015 pay scale reform (doubling the salary 
of civil servants) on the qualifications and Public Service Motivation (PSM) (strong 
desire to work in the public sector) of applicants and incumbent officers of BCS. A 
difference-in-differences analysis reveals that the BCS officers hired after the reform are 
not only academically better qualified but also more motivated to work in public service 
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than those hired before the reform. The evidence her suggests that salary increases can 
be an effective measure for enhancing quality of recruited officers. 
Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence that financial and non-financial incentives, 
in combination with increased monitoring, can improve the service delivery of 
government agricultural extension agents. The effectiv ness of those incentives was 
explored through a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) conducted in the form of a rank-
order tournament at 40 sub-district agriculture offices in Bangladesh with 807 agricultural 
extension officers. To motivate poorly performing extension agents, the rank order was 
set so as to hinder better performers at the baseline. Even though all of the treatments led 
to a general improvement in performance, increased monitoring of the two worst-
performing agents among those selected for inspection was the most effective means of 
improving service delivery by poor performers. Chapter 3 also documents the effect of 
heterogeneous treatment on performance by gender, job tenure, and initial performance 
of extension officers, as well as initial performance variation by office. The results of the 
analysis indicate that incentives should be implemented with consideration of context and 
the baseline characteristics of the government agriculture extension workers. 
Based on its examination of two issues related to development and poverty, this 
dissertation suggests that in order to attract higher quality workers and enhance public 
service delivery in the public sector of a developing country, at least in the context of the 
Bangladesh public sector, policymakers should consider ncentives as a potentially 
important policy element.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
A strong and competent public sector is a necessary backbone of a country; and is a key 
in reducing of poverty by ensuring sustainable development (Nunberg and Nellis, 1990; 
UNDP, 2005; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016). However, the public sector in many 
developing countries suffers from low morale and low productivity; and from excessive 
size, inefficiency, insufficient pay, politicization, lack of professionalism, low 
productivity, and corruption (Nunberg and Nellis, 1990; Shepherd, 2003). Reforming the 
public sector is a pre-requisite issue for countries that are concerned about stable 
economic development. Besides this, good governance in th  public sector, demanded by 
donor agencies, is growing in importance in many developing countries. Therefore, to 
cope with globalization and the acceleration of progress in economic development, an 
efficient and vibrant public sector is very much necessary. Though many developing 
countries have tried to reform their public sector, in the end, many of them did not succeed 
(Shepherd, 2003; UNDP,2005). However, public sector reform is not an easy task in 
developing countries due to a lack of political commitment (Nunberg and Nellis, 1990; 
UNDP, 2005). As public service delivery is the main task of the public sector workers, 
motivating employees to provide effective service delivery is one of the most important 
challenges, in any reform initiative in developing countries. In developed countries 
(OECD countries), pay for performance is widely used policy to increase productivity 
and motivate employees, but it is not common in developing countries, and its 
effectiveness for motivating employees to exert greater effort is mixed (Hasnain, 
Manning, and Pierskalla, 2012). In a review of the oretical and empirical literature 
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regarding performance pay, Hasnain, Manning, and Pierskalla, (2012) found that 
performance pay was effective in developed countries, but its effectiveness in developing 
countries has not been studied rigorously. However, as an important policy tool to 
improve the productivity of the employees, researche s ave started using incentives (e.g. 
pay for performance) to increase public service delivery in developing countries. Most of 
the studies on this topic are in the context of frontline workers (education and health 
sector), and studies on core policymakers1 (elite civil service officers) and other sectors 
(e.g. agriculture sector) are scarce (Finan, Olken, & Pande, 2017; Hasnain, Manning and 
Pierskalla, 2012). Considering the scarcity of studies in this regard, this dissertation 
outlined the two case studies that examine the effect of incentives on the frontline workers 
of the Bangladesh public agriculture sector2 and elite civil service officers of Bangladesh.  
In the history of Bangladesh, the year 2008 was a landmark as it was the first time 
when Bangladesh got a comprehension visionary (Perspective Plan) to become a middle-
income country by 2021. Fortunately, before 2021, Bangladesh already became a lower-
middle-income country. Recently the government is working on formulating another 
Perspective Plan 2022 to 2041. Under this perspective plan, Bangladesh aspires to 
become a prosperous and developed country. However, the policymakers identified two 
main important challenges to achieve the Vision 2041: a. ensuring stable, faster economic 
growth, and b. reducing poverty (Alam, 2019; World Bank, 2020). To meet these two 
challenges, policymakers of Bangladesh emphasized on ref rming the public sector into 
                                                 
1 This is because in the context of frontline workers, performance output is easy to measure but 
for the core policy makers, it is difficult to measure the performance as they are entrusted with 
doing multiple tasks (Hasnain, Manning and Pierskalla, 2012) 
2 Most of the previous studies conducted in the frontline workers in education and health sector. 
In the context of agriculture sector, so far evidence based rigorous studies are absent in this regard.    
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a sound and innovative public sector to prepare and implement policies, on the one hand. 
Besides, a sound and innovative public agricultural extension services are necessary to 
increase agricultural productivity to reduce poverty, on the other hand (General Economic 
Division, 2012; World Bank, 2020). In 2015, the government of Bangladesh reformed the 
public sector pay scale by offering higher wages to at ract higher quality officers in its 
public sector (Islam, 2016). This is the first case study of this dissertation in documenting 
whether the 2015 pay scale reform was successful in attracting higher quality officers in 
BCS. Increasing the agricultural productivity of the agriculture sector is another important 
priority of the government to achieve Vision 2041. To increase productivity, the 
government has emphasized introducing new technologies and crop diversification, and 
for which efficient public extension services are a pre-requisite. The second case study in 
this dissertation, presented in chapter three, is rlevant for its focus on means of enhancing 
agricultural extension services through public extension workers.  
1.1.1 2015 pay scale reform to attract higher quality officers in the Bangladesh 
civil service  
 
 In the perspective plan (2010-2021) for the achievement of Vision 2021, there is 
a clear vision: to ensure an efficient, corruption-free and politically neutral public sector 
to carry out stable and rapid economic growth in Bagl desh (General Economic Division, 
2012). In recent years, the government of Bangladesh has taken various initiatives to 
strengthen its public sector. Those initiatives include the formulation of laws, the offering 
of incentives by means of pay scale reform, best staff/officer awards for public service 
delivery, and the strengthening of the anti-corruption agency (Ahmed, 2019). Though 
deeper and more comprehensive public sector reform is an urgent issue, it is not possible 
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to reform the whole public sector radically within a short period (Alam and Kijima, 2020; 
Islam, 2016). Therefore, considering the government priority on fostering a sound and 
innovative public sector, there is a need to attract highly qualified workers to the public 
sector. Therefore, the government reformed the pay sc le in 2015 so as to offer higher 
pay than the private sector. The lowest and the highest basic salary have been fixed at Tk. 
8,250 (up from Tk. 4,100), and Tk.75,000 (up from Tk. 40,000), respectively (Islam, 2016, 
Ministry of Finance, 2015). At that point, after the 2015 pay scale reform, public sector 
pay was much higher3 than private sector (BBS, 2017; Khan, 2015). Previously, the pay 
scales had been increased several times but not by as much as the 2015 pay scales. Again 
the value of the increased pay scales was promptly eroded by inflation (Islam, 2016). 
Expectations after the 2015 pay scale reform were high, the government and civil society 
and prominent economists of the country expected that the enhanced pay scales would 
help to curb corruption and to attract meritorious, sincere and efficient individuals to join 
the public sector of Bangladesh (CPD, 2015). In that light, the second chapter of this 
dissertation investigates the effect of the reform n the quality and motivational profiles 
of civil service applicants and incumbent civil service officers. This dissertation 
compared the cognitive qualities and motivational profiles of incumbent civil service 
officers and applicants who took the civil service exam before the 2015 pay scale reform 
and those who took it after the reform. The results show that the 2015 pay scale reform 
                                                 
3 The minimum monthly gross salary in the public sector is 13,875 BDT3 (appx.  $175), whereas 
in the garments sector it is 5300 BDT (appx. $68), in the engineering sector it is BDT 12,594 
(appx. $ 159), in the textile sector (cotton) it is BDT 9922 (appx. $125). Therefore, Public sector 
wages in Bangladesh is higher than average minimum wages (appx. $131) in the industrial sector 
and manufacturing sectors of Bangladesh. See detail in Khan, 2015 (pp.243-246) (The current 
data are calculated and adapted by following the methods of  Khan, 2015 by taking data from 
BBS, 2016). 
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was successful in attracting highly qualified officers and applicants with higher 
motivational profiles than previous. Investigating the effect of large public sector reform 
on the quality and motivation of elite incumbent civil service officers and applicant pool 
is a new approach in the public administration and economic literature. 
This case study (chapter 2) contributes to broader nascent literature of labor 
economics as well as of personnel economics of the public sector which investigates the 
effect of higher wages on applicant’s qualities andPublic Service Motivation (PSM) by 
presenting a piece of new evidence on elite civil service applicants in a developing 
country. Although elite civil service officers (mid-level policymaker) are key players in 
the public sector to prepare and implement public policies, no other studies investigate 
the effect of a national level pay scales increase on the quality and motivational profile of 
both applicants and incumbent civil service officers. Most studies in this area are 
theoretical (Kreps, 1997;  Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Prendergast, 2007); and empirical 
studies are few (Finan et al., 2017). The only existing empirical literature is Dal Bo et al. 
(2013) which examines the effect of higher wages on the recruitment of public workers 
for the municipality offices in Mexico. 
1.1.2 Improving the performance of the public agricultural extension service 
In its work to achieve Vision 2021 and 2041 through enactment of the 2016 
extension policy, the government of Bangladesh emphasizes the importance of 
agricultural extension services for all the farmers. Traditionally, extension services are 
provided only to selected groups of middle-class farmers, and public extension agents 
depend mainly on key farmers to disseminate new technologies. In that situation, under 
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the current public extension system, marginal farmers (80% of farmers) are deprived of 
public extension services (ASIRP, 2003).  
Agricultural extension agents (known as SAAO/block supervisor) are the key 
players in the Bangladesh public sector extension agency for the provision of extension 
services directly to the farmers (ASIRP, 2003; Haque, 2011). Historically, from 1990s, 
when appointment of public sector extension agents began, those agents did not generally 
perform satisfactorily. A national level survey, ASIRP (2003), found that around 50% of 
farmers had not heard of the extension services provided by public sector extension agents, 
and some of the farmers claimed that they had receiv d services from the block supervisor, 
but infrequently. In an evaluation report for Extension and Research Project (ERP I and 
II, 1977-1991), the World Bank found that in a fortnight, although agriculture assistants 
were supposed to meet 80 farmers, on average they only met 20–25 officers 
(ASIRP,2003). For a long time there was no reply to the empirical question, why do public 
sector extension agents not work properly, and how can they be motivated to work harder? 
The chapter three address these empirical questions.  
Due to the current unsatisfactory extension services, an important challenge in the 
Bangladesh public agriculture sector is to motivate extension agents to increase their 
performance. In 2016, though the government of Bangladesh formulated a new extension 
policy to ensure effective public extension services for all types of farmers (DAE, 2018), 
until 2017, the performance of the public agricultural extension workers was not satisfied 
which was found in a survey conducted on the public extension agents and managerial 
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extension personnel in 2017.4 The survey did not find satisfactory extension servic s by 
the extension agents, and the survey results showed that poor performance of the 
extension agents is a noteworthy problem in Bangladesh. As the inefficiency remained in 
the public agricultural extension services sector in Bangladesh for a long time, even there 
are no evidence-based rigorous studies in this regard. Therefore, urgent effective policies 
are needed to strengthen public agricultural extension ervices of Bangladesh. Thus, 
based on other studies that found that to increase the performance of the public sector 
workers, incentives can be an efficient tool, an initiative has been taken in the chapter 3 
to test the effect of the incentive policy on the performance of the public extension agents 
of Bangladesh. To do so, a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) has been conducted to know 
how to motivate public extension agents of Bangladesh to increase their performance 
which is documented in chapter three. To motivate ext nsion agents, and to increase 
performance, financial, non-financial incentives, and increased monitoring was offered. 
It was found in the RCT that incentives were effective o increase the performance of the 
extension agents, on average. In the RCT, tournament type incentives were offered to 
motivate the public sector extension agent’s performance, which is the novelty of this 
research, so far literature in this regard is absent.  
This case study (chapter 3) contributes to the literature which investigates to 
improve the agricultural extension services (adoption of new technology) in the 
developing economies (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006, BenYishay & Mobarak, 2019; Krishnan 
& Patnam, 2013; Kondylis et al., 2017). These studies examined the importance of social 
                                                 
4 To carry out another research, in 2017, a survey was conducted to explore the effects of the 2015 pay 
scale reform on the public agriculture extension sector by the author. The survey subjects were 
extension agents and managerial extension personnel in the filed level agriculture offices.  
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networking to diffuse new agricultural technologies n the developing country's context. 
This study has attempted to answer how to improve the performance of the frontline 
public sector workers. This study also contributes to the literature which evaluates the 
effect of the incentives on the frontline public sector workers for increasing the service 
delivery (Ashraf et al. 2014 for health workers by oth monetary and non-monetary 
incentives to promote HIV prevention; Glewwe et al. 2010 and Mbiti et al., 2019; 
Muralidharan & Sundaraman 2011 for school teachers by financial incentives to increase 
students’ test score). This study (chapter 3) estimates the relative effectiveness of the 
incentives (both financial and non-financial) and monitoring on the incumbent 
agricultural extension officers. 
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1.2 Organization of the dissertation 
In this dissertation, there are two main chapters including introduction (chapter 1) 
and conclusion (chapter 4). Chapter 2 documented th incentives effect (2015 pay scale 
reform) on the quality and motivational profiles of the incumbent civil service officers 
and civil service applicants of BCS. Following the introduction, this chapter presents the 
institutional background of BCS and the context of the pay scale reforms in Bangladesh, 
the conceptual framework, and hypotheses. In the subsequent sections, the data and 
characteristics of the sample are presented, and the empirical methods and estimation 
results are discussed thereafter. The final section presents the summary and conclusion. 
Chapter three of this dissertation discusses the inc ntives’ effect on the performance of 
public extension agents. Following the introduction, the other sections present the 
institutional background of agricultural extension services, the methodology, 
experimental design, and empirical methods. The descriptive statistics, estimation result, 
the robustness of findings, and the “do no harm” principle for experimentation, 
concluding remarks and directions for future research are discussed in the subsequent 
sections.  
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Chapter 2 
Can a Higher Wage Attract Better-Quality Applicants Without 
Deteriorating Public Service Motivation? Evidence from the 
Bangladesh Civil Service  
 
2.1 Introduction  
A competent civil service, as a core element of state c pacity, is essential for the efficient 
provision of public services and key to reducing poverty in developing countries (Rose-
Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). However, the civil service in many developing countries is 
characterized by low productivity (Nunberg & Nellis, 1990; Shepherd, 2003). It is widely 
recognized that lower compensation in the public sector is one of the main reasons for 
this low productivity (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010; Finan, Olken, & Pande, 2017). Therefore, 
offering greater financial incentives can be an effective policy instrument to motivate 
those who were already hired and/or to recruit higher-quality candidates for public sector 
jobs (De Ree, Muralidharan, Pradhan, & Rogers, 2018). Unlike private-sector jobs, 
however, it is often the case that the performance of civil servants is difficult to measure 
objectively.5 This is why public sector does not normally adopt performance-based 
payment and instead tries to recruit people who are willing to work hard without financial 
incentives (Prendergast, 2007).  
 
                                                 
5 Empirical studies examining the effect of financial incentive on performance in public sector 
jobs are limited to frontline service providers such as school teachers (De Ree et al. 2018; Duflo 
et al. 2012) and community health providers (Ashraf et al. 2016; Banerjee et al. 2008).  
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This desire to work unselfishly in the public sector is known as Public Service 
Motivation (PSM) (Perry, 1996). It is found that those with high PSM strongly aspire to 
join the public sector to serve the community (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2008; Francois, 2000). 
PSM is, therefore, an important predictor for productivity and service delivery in the 
public sector (Perry & Vandenabeele, 2015). However, whether higher wages attract 
workers with lower PSM to civil service depends on the correlation between PSM and 
productivity (Barigozzi, Burani, & Raggi, 2018). Ifthese are positively (negatively) 
correlated, financial incentives attract (screen out) individuals with not only high quality 
but also high PSM. Therefore, it is possible that offering a higher wage can screen out 
those with high PSM from civil service jobs.  
The existing empirical literature examining the effect of financial incentives on 
recruitment shows mixed results and is limited to the case community agents, not higher-
level officers. With respect to positive effects, Dal Bo, Finan, & Rossi (2013) find that 
higher wages attract individuals with higher pro-social motivation for community 
development agent positions in marginalized municipalities in Mexico.6 For negative 
effects, Deserrano (2019) finds that higher financil incentives attract more applicants but 
crowd out the most socially motivated people from community health promoter positions 
in Uganda. Based on a lab-in-the-field experiment with college students in Indonesia, 
Banuri and Keefer (2016) find that once a higher salary is offered, students with lower 
                                                 
6  In a closely related study, Ashraf, Bandiera, andLee (2018) find that, in the recruitment of 
community health workers in Zambia, career incentives to ascend the civil-service career ladder 
to better-paid positions help the public sector to at ract candidates with higher PSM. 
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PSM are more likely to choose to join the public setor.7 Thus, in the recruitment for civil 
service positions with high promotion prospects, there have been no rigorous empirical 
studies thus far that examine whether higher financial incentives screen out those with 
higher PSM.  
This chapter examines the role of financial incentives in recruiting Bangladesh 
civil service (BCS) officers. BCS plays a key role in preparing policy and executing, 
supervising, and monitoring the tasks of the governme t (Zafarullah, 2003). However, 
the performance of BCS has not been satisfactory. According to World Bank governance 
indicators, the efficiency of BCS is low and declining (Khan, 2015). This is believed to 
be because the quality of the civil servants is not high, particularly due to a low salary 
(Jahan & Sahan, 2012). In July 2015, the Bangladesh government doubled the civil 
service pay scales (Rahman & Al-Hasan, 2018),8 after which the number of applicants 
increased dramatically (Hossain, 2019a; Islam, 2019). 
This chapter contributes to the literature by answering the question if the financial 
incentive attracts people with higher educational achievement but lower PSM to the 
public sector. Using the reform as a natural experim nt, this chapter estimates the impact 
of the higher wage on the qualifications and the motivational profiles of BCS applicants 
and incumbent officers. It is based on the data colle ted by face-to-face interviews with 
                                                 
7 Using a lab experiment on Indian college students, Hanna and Wang (2017) find that those who 
cheat on a dice task and those with lower pro-social preferences are more likely to prefer entering 
government service after graduation, regardless of cognitive ability. 
8 Just before the pay-scale reform, the average monthly wage was 17,969 BDT ($ 225) in the 
private sector and 22,040 BDT ($ 276) in the public se tor. The wage differential between public 
and private wage increased from 10.6 percent in 2013 to 22.7 percent in 2015 (Rahman and Al-
Hasan, 2018). 
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civil service applicants and incumbent officers who to k the BCS examination before the 
reform and those who took it after. The estimation results show that BCS officers who 
were hired after the reform are better, both in academic records and PSM, than those 
before the reform.  
This chapter contributes to the broader literature on labor economics and on public 
sector personnel economics, which investigates the effect of higher wages on recruitment 
(Dal Bo et al., 2013; Deserranno, 2019; Ashraf et al., 2018). To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, no other study has investigated the effect of a national-level pay-scale 
increase on the applicant pool of the elite civil service in developing countries. This 
chapter provides new evidence regarding the effect of the national-level compensation 
policy on the type of civil service applicants.9 
To conduct the study in this chapter, a large survey was conducted on around 300 
elite civil service officers (mid-level elite officers) and around 120 non-qualified civil 
service applicants. The number of samples of BCS officers is nationally representative as 
they were 40% of the total officers of 33, 34, and 35th BCS batches (sample batches of 
this study).  List of non-qualified civil service applicants was also collected from coaching 
center. Another list of non-qualified applicants was prepared after collecting names of 
non-qualified friends (applicants) from qualified BCS officers. This is a unique data set 
                                                 
9 There are empirical studies examining the performance of civil service officers in developing 
countries. Bertrand et al. (2018) find that the India  Administrative service (IAS) officers entering 
the civil service at a later age have lower promotion prospects, which results in lower performance 
as measured by stakeholders’ evaluation and suspension records. Rasul and Rogger (2018), 
examining the Nigerian civil service, show that offices’ use of more management practices on 
performance incentives is negatively correlated with the performance measure of the development 
projects’ completion rate.  
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in the literature which was collected from elite civil service officers (policymakers) as the 
data and research is scarce in the context of public sector policymakers. Once again, this 
research is the first research that documented how to measure the quality and motivational 
profile of elite civil service officers.   
Following this introduction, this chapter presents the institutional background of 
BCS and the pay scale reforms in the next section. The section that follows explains the 
conceptual framework and postulate hypotheses. The data and characteristics of the 
sample are presented in the next section, and the empirical methods and estimation results 
are discussed thereafter. The final section presents the summary and conclusions.  
2.2 Institutional Background of Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) and Pay Scale 
Reforms 
BCS is vertically divided into four classes (Class I to IV). Class-I officers conduct 
managerial and professional activities and are further divided into two categories: BCS 
cadre officers and Non-BCS gazette officers. In general, promotion prospects are higher 
for BCS cadre officers than for non-BCS gazette officers (Khan, 2015; Ferdous, 2015). 
BCS is vertically divided into 28 service cadres. The 28 cadres are divided into two main 
categories: managerial (general) cadres and technical cadres (Islam, 2016; Khan, 2015; 
Kim & Monem, 2009). Civil service officers’ status and ranking are set by the grades (20 
is the lowest and 1 is the highest) (Ministry of Finance, 2015). 
The recruitment of civil service officers is managed and administered by the 
Bangladesh Public Service Commission (BPSC), an independent constitutional body. All 
ministries apprise BPSC of their vacant posts through the Ministry of Public 
Administration (MOPA). The civil service examination consists of (1) preliminary 
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examination, (2) the written examination, and (3) the viva voce examination10 (Jahan, 
2012 & MOPA, 2014). Until 2018, 56% of the positions were allocated according to quota 
provisions for privileged groups such as freedom fighters’ descendants, women (10%), 
and people from backward districts and indigenous communities and physically 
challenged individuals (Khan, 2015).11  
After the independence of Bangladesh, the government ade several attempts to 
increase the civil servant pay-scales to align the salary with the cost of living. However, 
since the inflation rate was higher than the pay increases, the benefit from the increased 
pay eroded within a few months (Islam, 2016; Khan, 2015). In July 2015, the government 
reformed the civil servant pay structures, which was the first time this was done based on 
inflation and living costs. Previously, most applicants came from the arts and humanities, 
whereas after the 2015 pay scale reform, students from other departments, especially 
engineering, have begun to apply for civil service general cadre (administrative and 
managerial than technical cadre) jobs (Azad, 2018; Hossain, 2019b; Mujumdar, 2017).  
2.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
The research question of this chapter is if the financial incentive attracts people 
with higher educational achievement but lower PSM to the public sector. Roy’s (1951) 
                                                 
10 BPSC members chair the viva board, which consists of a psychologist from a recognized 
university and higher government officials from a ministry nominated by the Ministry of Public 
Administration (Khan, 2015). The viva board members as ess the candidates based on their 
intellectuality, emotional stability, smartness, lead rship attributes, and involvement in other 
activities, such as sports, debate competitions, and hobbies (MOPA, 2014). In 2013, the number 
of applicants for the BCS exam was 221,575, of which 9,515 passed the written exam and 2,175 
were selected for appointment. In 2015, 244,107 people applied for the BCS exam; 6,088 of them 
passed the written exam and 2,158 were selected for appointment (BPSC, 2015).  
11 During the survey, there were all types of quotas including 10% women quota. Our sampled 
applicants and BCS officers enjoyed the quota privileges who were eligible.   
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model shows that candidates select a job if his/her expected return from the job is higher 
than the reservation wage. The expected return depen s on the skills needed for a 
particular job and expected wage from the job. The expected returns include utility gains 
and satisfaction from the job. Therefore, even for the same job, the expected returns can 
differ based on the preference of job characteristics. Those who have higher PSM are 
expected to have higher satisfaction from public rather than the private sector jobs in a 
given wage. When the public sector wage was lower than hat in private sector, those with 
high PSM and low reservation wage tend to apply for the public sector jobs.  
Since the 2015 pay scale reform drastically increased salaries in the public sector 
compared with the private sector, it can equally attrac  people with high PSM and high 
reservation wage and those with low PSM and high reservation wage. As long as the 
number of higher-qualified candidates with high PSM increases and the selection 
committee can detect candidates with low PSM, the quality of civil service officers is 
expected to improve after the reform without sacrificing PSM.  
2.4 Data and Empirical method 
2.4.1 Data and sample 
From 2012 to 2015, the BPSC invited applications for the 33rd, 34th, and 35th BCS 
examinations (advertised in February 2012, February 2013, and September, 2014, 
respectively). The news about the pay scale reform that the government for civil servants 
had already been released before the advertisement of the 35th BCS examination,12 and 
                                                 
12 The news of the 2015 pay scale reform was published in August 2014 (Daily Nation, 2014). 
There was an analysis of the pay scales by the leading think tank of Bangladesh on September 8, 
2014 (CPD, 2015). 
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thus, its applicants are considered as the post-reform cohort. Those who took the 33rd and 
34th BCS examinations were pre-reform cohorts.  
Data from both BCS personnel and the applicants whodid not pass the BCS 
examination were collected by the authors. The survey was conducted from October 15 
to December 20, 2017. As the information on the applicants for civil service examination 
is confidential, it was not possible to acquire a complete list of applicants. Therefore, to 
prepare a nationally representative sample, data were collected from three groups: (1) 303 
junior-level BCS (administration cadre) officers who applied for the BCS examinations 
in 2012, 2013, and 2015; this sample size is the 40% of the total BCS (Administration 
cadre) officers13 (2) 108 applicants who attended a coaching center and applied for the 
BCS examinations held in 2012, 2013, and/or 2015, but did not pass; and, (3) 22 friends 
of group (1) above, who took the BCS examination in 2012, 2013, and/or 2015 but did 
not pass.  
For the results to be nationally representative, data were collected from 32 districts 
covering all eight divisions of Bangladesh.14 Based on the number of officers in the 
district administration office, 8 to 15 BCS officers from each office were randomly 
sampled, to obtain a total of 303. Of these, the number of officers who took the 
examination in 2012, 2013, and 2015 was 90, 98, and 115, respectively. Interviewers were 
properly trained to explain the purpose of the research and the confidentiality of responses 
                                                 
13 In the BCS (Administration cadre), the number of officers recruited are 290, 279, and 280 in 
2012, 2013, and 2015, respectively (BPSC, 2015). Only BCS (administration cadre) officers are 
selected as sample. This is because there are few of icers recruited for other cadre services in 
2012, 2013, and 2015. 
14 Based on the number of districts within the division, 2 to 5 district offices from each division 
were randomly selected. 
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to the participants, so that they would be willing to provide honest answers to the 
questions. The interviews were conducted individually and separately. 
The list of applicants who took the examination in 2012, 2013, and 2015 was 
collected from an established coaching center15 in Dhaka. From the list, 108 individuals 
were randomly selected. The interviews normally took place at the respondent’s home or 
office, as requested by the respondent. The BCS officers in the sample were first 
interviewed and the list of their friends’ names and cellphone numbers was collected by 
asking whether they have friends who applied for the BCS examination in the same year 
but did not pass. Thereafter, 22 individuals were sl cted from the list.  
2.4.2 Measures of qualities 
To measure the raw qualities of the civil service applicants, both their cognitive 
and non-cognitive abilities were assessed. The cognitive abilities were measured by the 
highest grade (A+) on their Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination and whether 
he/she is a graduate from an engineering university/department. The SSC examination is 
a centralized public examination held after 10 years of schooling (NUFFIC, 2012). In 
Bangladesh, those who apply to engineering universiti s need to receive at least 90% 
marks both in the secondary and higher secondary public exams. Whether one studies in 
the engineering department is a good proxy of a good academic record. The monthly real 
                                                 
15  In Bangladesh, there are a few coaching centers that offer intensive programs for the 
preparation of BCS exam. Generally, after graduation, a good number of applicants take the BCS 
examination after preparation via a coaching center. The coaching centers are few, and mostly 
located in Dhaka. Anyone can enroll in the coaching centers by paying around $125. The course 
duration is 1-6 months (most commonly 3 months) for preliminary, written, and viva voce 
examinations.  
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gross income in the previous job is also used as a measure of work-related skills as a high 
grade in school does not guarantee that one has higher productivity in the workplace. As 
a measure of non-cognitive ability, the Big-Five Personality Traits are used to capture 
different dimensions of the sampled individuals’ personalities, which are necessary to 
perform effectively in the workplace.  
Public Service Motivation (PSM) is considered to be an important characteristic 
for public-sector workers to provide public services ffectively (Perry & Wise, 2005; 
Francois, 2000; Kwon, 2012; Naff & Crum, 1999). PSM is measured through Perry’s 
(1996) PSM scale. Since PSM is closely related to pro-social behavior and social 
preferences (Dal Bo et al., 2013), the pro-social behavior and the social preferences of the 
applicants are used in the analyses. For measuring p o-social behavior, the applicants are 
asked whether they participated in either volunteer or charity activities before applying 
for the civil service examination. By using non-ince tivized hypothetical questions, social 
preference measures such as patience, risk-aversion, and altruism are elicited.16 
2.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents the average characteristics of the civil service applicants and 
incumbent civil service officers who applied for the BCS examination before and after 
the pay scale reform (pre- and post-reform cohorts). Panel A consists of socio-
demographic and parental characteristics while Panel B shows educational background. 
Panel C indicates variables related with personality traits. The first two columns of Table 
                                                 
16 See Appendix 2.A for how the Big-Five index, PSM, pro-social behavior, and pro-social 
preference are measured including other variables. 
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2.1 show the average characteristics of applicants who took the exam before and after the 
reform. The third column shows the results of the t-tes  (p-value) if the mean 
characteristics are statistically different between these two groups. The fourth and fifth 
columns indicate the mean characteristics of BCS officers who took the exam before and 
after the reform, respectively. The last column indicates whether the means of these two 
groups are different. 
The first three columns of Table 2.1 show that applicants who took the exam after 
the reform are less likely to be married, to have quota privilege, and to have experience 
in working in the private sector, and are more likely to have a father who owns a business, 
to obtain the highest grade in the SSC exam, and to have attended school in an urban area 
than applicants who took exam before the reform. According to the last three columns, 
BCS officers who took the exam after the reform are less likely to be married or agreeable, 
and are more likely to have the highest grade in SSC, to study engineering, and to have 
had a higher income in the previous job. In terms of parental education and labor-force 
participation, there is no difference between the post-reform and pre-reform cohorts. As 
shown in Panel C, there are no significant differences in personality traits of pre- and 
post-reform cohorts both in applicant pool and BCS officers.  
Table 2.2 presents the PSM (Panel A), pro-social behaviors (Panel B), and social 
preferences (Panel C). Regarding the applicant pool, there is no difference in PSM index 
between pre-and post-reform cohorts. Among civil servic  officers, however, the post-
reform cohort has higher PSM than the pre-reform cohort. On average, pro-social 
behaviors of pre- and post-reform cohorts are comparable in both the applicant pool and 
among BCS officers. Panel C suggests mixed results. While applicants in the post-reform 
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cohort tend to have worse social preferences than tose in the pre-reform cohort, BCS 
officers in the post-reform cohort tend to be more patient and more altruistic to the poor 
than those in the pre-reform cohort, which are desirable characteristics for public servants.  
2.4.4 Estimation Models  
The descriptive statistics showed that both in the applicant pool and among BCS 
officers, educational qualification measured by the SSC exam improved on average after 
the reform. In terms of PSM, there is no difference between the pre and post cohorts in 
the applicant pool, while the PSM of BCS officers after the reform is higher than in those 
before. It was also found that BCS officers who took the exam after the reform tend to 
have better social preferences than those before the reform. In this section, to test if even 
after controlling for other characteristics, BCS officers after the reform are more 
motivated than those before the reform, following estimation models are used. 
The effect of financial incentive on the qualities and motivational profiles of the 
BCS applicant pool is estimated by the following Ordinary Least Square models, similar 
to those of Dal Bo et al. (2013), Deserranno (2019), and Donato et al. (2017): 
  =  + 	
 +  + 			……………………………………..……..Eq. 1 
where	 is educational quality (highest grade in the SSC examination or engineering 
graduate), the income at the previous job, personality traits, PSM, pro-social behavior, or 
social preferences. 	
 	takes the value 0 if individual i took the BCS examination 
before the 2015 pay scale reform and 1 otherwise. X  is a set of the individual i’s 
characteristics, determined before he or she took the SSC examination, including age, sex, 
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location of childhood (whether raised in an urban area), schooling years, and occupation 
of parents. While α, β, and ρ are coefficients to be estimated, e is an error term.  
 The effect of the pay-scale reform on the applicant pool is estimated by . The 
sample was used in this chapter is applicants who applied just before and just after 2015. 
It is not likely that all the difference in characteristics of applicants come from time trend. 
As long as there was no change in policy and economic conditions which can be 
confounders of occupation choice of applicants just before and after 2015, it is argued 
that it is likely to be the effect of the pay-scale reform. As described in Appendix 2.B, 
there were no major changes in the BCS recruitment policy, education policies, and labor 
market situation in Bangladesh (ADB & ILO, 2016; Hossain & Mohammad, 2015; Khan 
et al., 2014) which can affect the characteristics of the applicant pool.  Since BCS officers 
were over-sampled, sampling weights are applied in all the analyses to represent the 
applicant pool accurately. The standard errors are clustered at the survey location 
(districts and training centers where interviews were conducted) and by interviewer.  
The effect of the reform on BCS officers’ qualities and motivation profiles is 
estimated by the difference-in-difference (DID) approach:  
	 =  + 	
 + 	
 ×  + 	 +  + …………………………….eq. 2  
where  takes the value 1 if the individual passed the examin tion (i.e., is a BCS officer) 
and 0 otherwise. While α, β, b, c, and ρ are coefficients to be estimated, e is an error term. 
If officers in the post-reform cohort have lower PSM (motivational profiles) on average, 
the coefficient of the interaction term, b, will be negative. 
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If the pay scale reform not only increased salary but also screening method, the 
beta coefficient cannot identify the effect of increased salary on officers' characteristics. 
As explained in Appendix 2.B, the recruitment process was not change largely after the 
pay scale reform. Furthermore, in this DID model, what to be identified is just that a 
difference between officers and non-qualified applicants increased or decreased after the 
reform.  As discussed in the next section that a comm n trend assumption holds, therefore, 
the identification strategy is valid. 
For identifying DID estimates, the common trend assumption must hold. Officers 
are of better academic quality than those who did not pass the examination, based on the 
fact that they passed the examination. The pre-reform trend (2012-2013) in quality should 
be comparable for officers and non-officers. It is te ted whether the coefficient of an 
interaction term between the 2013 group and those who passed the examination (officers) 
is significantly different from zero by using the sample of those who took the examination 
either in 2012 or 2013. Both for the SSC examination grade and PSM index, the 
coefficients are not significant, suggesting that the common trend assumption is not 
violated.  
In this study, gender analyses has been done both for e applicant pool and BCS 
officers. In that case, Male (=1 if male and 0 otherwise) variable is interacted with Post 
variable in the estimation models of the applicant pool, and with Post×O variable in the 
estimation models of the BCS officers. 
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2.5 Estimation Results 
2.5.1 Effect of the reform on BCS applicant pool 
Table 2.3 shows the estimated coefficients of P st in Equation 1 for all the qualities and 
motivation profiles of Bangladesh civil service applicants. In 18 out of 21 models, there 
is no evidence that the pay-scale reform affected th  characteristics of the applicant pool. 
The results show that the higher wage attracted people who are more pro-social, less 
present-biased, and less risk-averse than those in th pre-reform cohort. These results are 
not expected but these characteristics are preferable for BCS officers. In the case of 
applicant pool, it is found that gender matters. The appendix table 2.5 and 2.6 exhibit that 
the female applicants showed more openness (more interested in new experiences and 
innovation) than male applicants, but male applicants showed more interested in policy 
making,  participated more in the voluntary activities, and were more most risk-averse.  
To summarize, there is no evidence that the higher wage attracted applicants with 
higher quality and with lower motivational profiles.17 Rather, applicants in the post-
reform cohort tend to be more engaged in volunteer and charity work, less present-biased, 
and less risk averse. More specifically, the effect of the 2015 pay-scale reform on the civil 
service applicant pool is not significant on averag. The more important question is 
whether the reform changed the quality of BCS officers or not, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
                                                 
17 See Full estimation results for BCS applicant pool in Appendix tables 2.1 and 2.2. 
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2.5.2 Effect of the reform on BCS officers 
Table 2.4 shows the estimated results on characteristics of BCS officers. As seen in the 
positive coefficient of 	
 × , BCS officers recruited after the pay-scale reform have 
higher SSC examination scores and an engineering background. Furthermore, BCS 
officers in the post-reform cohort have higher PSM index, particularly committed to 
public service, than those in the pre-reform cohort. The results on pro-social behavior and 
social preference show that BCS officers who applied for the examination after the reform 
tend to be more patient and altruistic to the poor. Regarding the personality traits, it is 
found that BCS officers recruited after the reform are less extraverted and more 
conscientious. These traits are well suited to being a BCS officer. In the case of gender 
analyses (Appendix Table 2.7-2.8), it was found that e previous log real income was 
higher for the female officers, and female officers scored higher in the PSM index and 
commitment to the public interest modules of PSM than male officers, though male 
officers scored higher for self-sacrifice module of PSM. 
In sum, BCS officers who joined the civil service after the pay scale reform have 
higher educational qualification, higher PSM, and better social preferences (patience and 
altruism) than those who joined before.18 Although there is no impact on the applicant 
pool on average, the increased number of applications from highly qualified individuals 
resulted in an improvement in the characteristics of BCS officers hired after the reform.   
                                                 
18 See Full estimation results for incumbent BCS officers in Appendix tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
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2.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter empirically examined whether financial incentives can be used as a 
policy instrument to recruit high-quality civil-service officers with high public-sector 
motivations by using the case of the 2015 pay scale reform in Bangladesh, which doubled 
the salaries of civil servants. Unlike the existing studies, this chapter examines the 
effectiveness of financial incentives on recruiting elite civil service officers. This is a 
main contribution of this chapter to the literature. The empirical results are encouraging: 
post-reform BCS officers have higher educational quality than pre-reform officers and 
higher PSM. Compared to pre-reform BCS officers, they are also more motivated to 
public service, more altruistic to the poor, and have higher social preferences. The results 
for the applicant pool show that applicants in the post-reform cohort are more engaged in 
volunteer and charity activities, less present biased, and less risk averse than applicants 
in the pre-reform cohort. Although Dal Bo et al. (2013) found that financial incentive 
improved the educational qualification of the applicant pool by examining frontline public 
sector workers, there is no evidence that financial incentive can improve educational 
quality of applicant pool for elite civil service jobs examined in this chapter.  
Since the performance of the work done by BCS officers is difficult to measure, 
this chapter did not examine the effect of the reform on the performance of the civil 
service per se. There is no guarantee that better quality individuals at the recruitment stage 
continuously perform in the long run, as Bertrand et al. (2018) find in the context of the 
Indian elite civil service, where those with lower promotion prospects are less motivated 
and inefficient in providing public service. As the promotion prospect in BCS is highly 
politicized and 84% of sampled BCS officers expressed concerns about promotion, the 
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government may need to introduce promotion criteria not based on lobbying and political 
choices. This can motivate officers to provide public service until retirement. This can 
also have a positive effect on recruiting better-quality individuals for the civil service, as 
also found in Morgan et al. (2012).  
Unfortunately, there is no enough data to conclude the effect of the pay-scale 
reform on the quality of service provision and corruption in Bangladesh at this point. 
According to Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), the corruption perception 
index (CPI) shows that corruption decreased from 2015 to 2016 but increased again in 
2018. Furthermore, CPI is an aggregate measure. The reform's effects can trickle down 
to grassroots in some services but not in the other services. Therefore, a future research 
is required to answer to this question. As expected also that the performance of the public 
sector would be improved after getting higher salary. However, whether the performance 
of BCS has improved due to the reform and whether t effects of the reform on the 
applicant pool in other sectors (local government) and cadre services (such as Tax, 
Customs, and Foreign Affairs) are similar to those found in this chapter (on BCS 
administrative cadre) remains a topic for future research. Author has also the plan to 
further study in this regards. 
Finally, as the civil service examination is conducted by the Bangladesh Public 
Service Commission, the list of applicants is confidential. Therefore, the list of applicants 
collected from the coaching centers may not perfectly representative to the actual 
applicant pool. It is important to keep this in mind as a caveat of this chapter.  
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Table 2.1 Socio-demographic condition, educational background, a  personality traits 
of the applicants and incumbent civil service officers who took the Bangladesh Civil 
Service (BCS) exam before and after the 2015 Pay Scle Reform 
Variables Applicants 
who took 
BCS exam 
before the 
reform 
Applicants 
took BCS 
exam after 
the reform 
p-
value 
Incumbent 
BCS 
officers 
who took 
BCS exam 
before the 
reform 
Incumbent 
BCS 
officers 
who took 
the BCS 
exam after 
the reform 
p-
value 
(1)                     (2) (3)     (4)                (5)                (6) 
Panel A: Mean Characteristics (Socio-demographic condition) 
Number of obs. 
 
279 154  188 115  
Married 0.60 0.28 0.00 0.79 0.46 0.00 
 (0.49) (0.45)  (0.41) (0.50)  
Male 0.80 0.73 0.11 0.69 0.68 0.84 
 (0.40) (0.44)  (0.46) (0.47)  
Raised in urban area 0.58 0.64 0.23 0.74 0.70 0.48 
 (0.49) (0.48)  (0.44) (0.46)  
Schooling years of  12.25 12.38 0.72 13.3 13.4 0.82 
father (4.08) (3.34)  (3.96) (3.39)  
Father does business 0.21 0.37 0.00 0.17 0.24 0.13 
 (0.41) (0.48)  (0.38) (0.43)  
Father is 1st/2nd class 
government officer 
0.19 0.26 0.10 0.27 0.34 0.13 
(0.39) (0.44)  (0.44) (0.48)  
Schooling years of  9.52 9.62 0.71 10.37 10.93 0.18 
mother (3.39) (2.26)  (3.49) (3.46)  
Mother has job 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.32 
 (0.31) (0.25)  (0.37) (0.41)  
Previous Log Real  10.25 10.24 0.87 10.21 10.45 0.00 
Income (0.39) (0.45)  (0.43) (0.43)  
Enroll in coaching  0.63 0.68 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.78 
center (0.63) (0.68)  (0.49) (0.49)  
Quota privilege 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.46 .50 0.58 
 (0.42) (0.32)  (0.50) (0.50)  
Did private sector job 0.33 0.18 0.00 0.34 0.27 0.17 
 (0.47) (0.38)  (0.48) (0.45)  
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Table 2.1 Socio-demographic condition, educational background, a d Personality traits 
of the applicants and incumbent civil service officers took the Bangladesh Civil Service 
(BCS) exam before and after the 2015 Pay Scale Reform, (contd.) 
Variables Applicants 
took BCS 
exam before 
the reform 
Applicants 
took BCS 
exam after 
the reform 
p- 
value 
Incumbent 
BCS officers 
took BCS 
exam before 
the reform 
Incumbent 
BCS officers 
took BCS 
exam after 
the reform 
p- 
value 
(1)                    (2)    (3)           (4)               (5) (6) 
Panel B: Mean Characteristics (Educational Background)  
Highest Grade in SSC  
exam 
0.19 0.32 0.00 0.24 0.51 0.00 
(0.47) (0.39)  (0.43) (0.50)  
Schooling Years 16.90 16.92 0.38 16.87 16.84 0.52 
 (0.30) (0.31)  (0.33) (0.49)  
Schooling in urban area 0.33 0.43 0.05 0.50 0.50 0.88 
 (0.47) (0.50)  (0.50) (0.50)  
Engineering graduate  0.07 0.08 0.73 0.10 0.28 0.00 
 (0.26) (0.28)  (0.30) (0.45)  
Panel C: Mean Characteristics (Personality traits)  
Big 5 Index 0.06 -0.00 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.43 
 (0.37) (0.37)  (0.43) (0.45)  
Extraversion 3.80 3.84 0.54 3.79 3.64 0.07 
 (0.65) (0.56)  (0.74) (0.67)  
Agreeableness 4.03 3.99 0.37 4.08 3.93 0.02 
 (0.46) (0.54)  (0.46) (0.56)  
Conscientiousness 3.63 3.54 0.13 3.59 3.65 0.42 
 (0.55) (0.65)  (0.62) (0.68)  
Neuroticism 2.67 2.69 0.87 2.67 2.67 0.99 
 (0.67) (0.66)  (0.77) (0.74)  
Openness 3.19 3.26 0.14 3.22 3.16 0.32 
 (0.47) (0.49)  (0.55) (0.56)  
Note: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations. Sampling weight is used during calculation. 
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Table 2.2 Public Service Motivation Score, Pro-Social Behavior and Social Preferences of the applicants and incumbent civil service 
officers who took BCS exam before and after the 2015 Pay Scale Reform 
Variables Applicants 
took BCS 
exam before 
the reform 
Applicants 
took BCS 
exam after 
the reform 
p- 
value 
Incumbent 
BCS officers 
took BCS 
exam before 
the reform 
Incumbent 
BCS officers 
took BCS 
exam after the 
reform 
p- 
value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Public Service Motivation 
Number of obs. 279 154  188 115  
 
PSM Index -0.17 -0.23 0.14 -0.21 -0.04 0.02 
 (0.45) (0.41)  (0.51) (0.52)  
Attraction to Policy Making 3.90 3.7 0.01 3.93 4.01 0.23 
  (0.50) (0.63)  (0.52) (0.57)  
Commitment to the Public Interest 3.79 3.86 0.13 3.74 4.03 0.00 
 (0.52) (0.45)  (0.54) (0.56)  
Social Justice 3.02 2.99 0.47 3.02 3.00 0.65 
 (0.35) (0.35)  (0.42) (0.52)  
Civic Duty 3.96 3.95 0.74 3.91 3.98 0.26  
(0.45) (0.37)  (0.54) (0.53)  
Compassion 3.06 2.96 0.02 3.02 3.04 0.77  
(0.46) (0.40)  (0.56) (0.57)  
Self-Sacrifice 4.00  4.04  0.80 4.02 4.11  0.14  
(0.42) (0.31)  (0.46) (0.59)  
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Table 2.2 Public Service Motivation Score, Pro-Social behavior and Social Preferences of the applicants and incumbent civil service 
officers who took BCS exam before and after the 2015 Pay Scale Reform (contd.) 
Variables Applicants 
took BCS 
exam before 
the reform 
Applicants 
took BCS 
exam after 
the reform 
p- 
value 
Incumbent 
BCS officers 
took BCS 
exam before 
the reform 
Incumbent 
BCS officers 
took BCS 
exam after the 
reform 
p- 
value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel B: Pro-social characteristics  
Participated in Volunteer activities 0.65 0.70 0.27 0.63 0.66 0.59 
 (0.48) (0.46)  (0.48) (0.47)  
Panel C: Social Preferences  
Least patient 0.75 0.82 0.09 0.72 0.54 0.03 
 (0.43) (0.39)  (0.45) (0.50)  
Present bias  0.06 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.89 
 (0.24) (0.14)  (0.28) (0.28)  
Risk averse (Most) 0.70 0.57 0.01 0.70 0.60 0.11 
 (0.46) (0.50)  (0.46) (0.49)  
Altruism to the poor family 5.88 5.42 0.09 6.15 7.26 0.00 
  (2.82) (2.63)  (3.24) (2.83)  
Note: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations. Sampling weight is used during calculation.  
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Table 2.3. Effect of the 2015 Pay Scale Reform on Applicant Pool 
Outcome variables Coeff. of Post 
(standard error) 
# obs 
R2 
 (1) (2) 
=1 if grade of SSC exam is A+ 0.06 433 
 (0.07) 0.09 
Engineering graduate 0.03 433 
 (0.02) 0.12 
log real income in previous job -1.03 433 
 (1.01) 0.12 
Big 5 index -0.04 433 
 (0.05) 0.03 
Extraversion 0.07 433 
 (0.07) 0.04 
Agreeableness -0.01 433 
 (0.15) 0.06 
Conscientiousness -0.03 433 
 (0.10) 0.05 
Neuroticism -0.05 433 
 (0.14) 0.09 
Openness 0.03 433 
 (0.11) 0.07 
PSM index -0.01 433 
 (0.08) 0.09 
Interested in Policy making -0.09 433 
 (0.13) 0.13 
Commitment to pub service 0.09 433 
 (0.10) 0.07 
Social Justice 0.02 433 
 (0.07) 0.04 
Civic duty -0.04 433 
 (0.09) 0.04 
Compassion -0.03 433 
 (0.06) 0.05 
Self-sacrifice -0.01 433 
 (0.05) 0.07 
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Table 2.3. Effect of the 2015 Pay Scale Reform on Applicant Pool (contd.) 
Outcome variables Coeff. of Post 
(standard error) 
# obs 
R2 
 (1) (2) 
=1 if Participated voluntary/charity activities 0.15*** 433 
 (0.05) 0.13 
=1 if Least Patient -0.02 433 
 (0.06) 0.12 
=1 if Present Bias -0.07** 433 
 (0.03) 0.08 
=1 if Most risk- averse -0.23** 433 
 (0.11) 0.09 
Altruism to poor (0-10) -0.54 433 
 (0.49) 0.05 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center 
where interviewed were undertaken) and enumerators re reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other controls are: age, male, urban, schooling years and occupation of father 
and mother. 
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Table 2.4 Effect of the 2015 Pay Scale Reform on BCS Officers 
Outcome variables Coeff. of Post 
x O (s.e) 
Coeff. of 
Post (s.e) 
Coeff. of 
O (s.e.) 
# obs 
R2 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) 
     
=1 if grade of SSC exam is A+ 0.17* 0.02 0.07 433 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) 0.10 
Engineering graduate 0.21*** -0.02 0.02 433 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 0.13 
log real income in previous job -0.11 -0.74 2.41** 433 
 (1.12) (1.27) (0.91) 0.09 
Big 5 index -0.02 -0.02 0.09 433 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) 0.03 
Extraversion -0.30*** 0.13 0.06 433 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) 0.04 
Agreeableness -0.19 0.05 0.05 433 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.09) 0.04 
Conscientiousness 0.20* -0.10 -0.09 433 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) 0.04 
Neuroticism 0.02 0.02 -0.01 433 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.14) 0.04 
Openness -0.21 0.10 0.11 433 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.07) 0.04 
PSM index 0.25** -0.10 0.01 433 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) 0.08 
Interested in Policy making 0.23 -0.19 0.19* 433 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) 0.15 
Commitment to public service 0.29** 0.02 -0.02 433 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 0.07 
Social Justice -0.05 0.01 0.03 433 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) 0.03 
Civic duty 0.12 -0.06 -0.11** 433 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) 0.03 
Compassion 0.15 -0.07 -0.06 433 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 0.05 
Self-sacrifice 0.12 -0.06 -0.00 433 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 0.04 
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Table 2.4 Effect of the 2015 Pay Scale Reform on BCS Officers (contd.) 
Outcome variables Coeff. of 
Post x O (s.e) 
Coeff. of 
Post (s.e) 
Coeff. of 
O (s.e.) 
# obs 
R2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Civic duty 0.12 -0.06 -0.11** 433 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) 0.03 
Compassion 0.15 -0.07 -0.06 433 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 0.05 
Self-sacrifice 0.12 -0.06 -0.00 433 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 0.04 
=1 if Participated voluntary/charity 
activities 
-0.07 0.15** 0.00 433 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.09 0.12 
=1 if Least Patient -0.28*** 0.09** 0.01 433 
 (0.09 (0.04) (0.07) 0.11 
=1 if Present Bias 0.04 -0.08* 0.05 433 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 0.08 
=1 if Most risk- averse 0.05 -0.21* 0.07 433 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) 0.08 
Altruism to poor (0-10) 1.98** -1.01* 0.52 433 
 (0.67) (0.53) (0.70) 0.07 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center 
where interviewed were undertaken) and enumerators re reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other controls are: age, male, urban, schooling years and occupation of father 
and mother. 
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Appendix: Full Estimation Results 
Appendix Table 2.1. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the education l qualifications, market skill, & personality of applicant pool 
 
 =1 if 
grade 
of SSC 
exam is 
A+ 
Engineering  
graduate 
log real 
income 
in 
previous 
job 
Big 5 
index 
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post 0.06 0.03 -1.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (1.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) 
Age -0.02 0.01 0.49*** 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Male -0.06 0.08** 1.27** 0.07 0.12 -0.05 -0.00 -0.12 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.57) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Raised in 
urban area 
0.13** 0.10*** 0.90* -0.03 -0.13* -0.02 0.06 -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.53) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Father’s 
education 
-0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s 
education 
0.01 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.02 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
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Appendix Table 2.1. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the education l qualifications, market skill, & personality of applicant pool 
(contd.) 
 =1 if 
grade 
of SSC 
exam is 
A+ 
Engineering  
graduate 
log real 
income 
in 
previous 
job 
Big 5 
index 
Extraversion  Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Father’s 
occupation  
0.08 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.16 -0.03 
(government) (0.08) (0.04) (1.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) 
Father’s 
occupation  
0.06 0.02 0.29 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 0.10** 
(business) (0.08) (0.03) (0.85) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05) 
Mother has 
job 
0.19** -0.01 -0.24 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.21 -0.39*** 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.66) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
Constant 0.67* -0.46** -12.66** -0.04 3.92*** 3.68*** 3.53*** 2.53*** 3.42*** 
 (0.36) (0.20) (5.35) (0.32) (0.52) (0.51) (0.41) (0.64) (0.43) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center where int rviewed were undertaken) and enumerators 
are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix Table 2.2. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the PSM, pro-social behavior, & social preferences of applicant pool 
 PSM 
index 
Interested 
in Policy 
making 
Commitment 
to pub 
service 
Social 
Justice 
Civic 
duty 
Compassion Self- 
sacrifice 
=1 if 
Participated 
voluntary and 
charity 
activities 
=1 if 
Least 
Patient 
=1 if 
Present 
Bias 
=1 if 
Most 
risk- 
averse 
Altruism 
to poor 
(0-10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post -0.03 -0.14 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.13** 0.01 -0.07** -0.20* -0.50 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.53) 
Age 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02* -0.01 0.02** -0.02 -0.01* -0.03** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Male 0.17*** 0.35*** 0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.35*** -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.44) 
Raised in urban -0.11***  0.04 -0.15*** -0.07* 0.00 -0.07 -0.11** -0.01 -0.08* 0.01 -0.09 0.72** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.33) 
Father’s education -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) 
Mother’s education 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) 
Father’s occupation  0.12* -0.00 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.14** 0.37 
(government) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.40) 
Father’s occupation  0.05 -0.12 0.17*** -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.08 -0.00 -0.03 -0.15***  0.06 
(business) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.44) 
Mother has job 0.04 -0.04 -0.14* 0.10* 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.17* -0.16 0.07 -0.17 0.11 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.05) (0.16) (0.58) 
Constant -0.35 3.96*** 3.25*** 3.04*** 3.88*** 2.54*** 4.31***  -0.29 1.52*** 0.33** 1.68*** 5.85*** 
 (0.30) (0.52) (0.45) (0.33) (0.31) (0.42) (0.28) (0.30) (0.35) (0.17) (0.41) (2.19) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.02 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center where int rviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix Table 2.3. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the education l qualifications, market skill, & personality of BCS officers 
 
 =1 if 
grade 
of 
SSC 
exam 
is A+ 
Engineering  
graduate 
log real 
income 
in 
previous 
job 
Big 5 
index 
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post x O 0.17* 0.21*** -0.11 -0.02 -0.30*** -0.19 0.20* 0.02 -0.21 
 (0.09) (0.06) (1.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.20) (0.16) 
Post 0.02 -0.02 -0.74 -0.02 0.13 0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.10 
 (0.08) (0.03) (1.27) (0.04) (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.18) (0.14) 
O 0.07 0.02 2.41*** 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.91) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07) 
Age -0.02 0.01 0.37** -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Male -0.04 0.09*** 1.64*** 0.08** 0.13* -0.04 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.54) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Raised in 
urban 
0.12** 0.09*** 0.50 -0.04 -0.14* -0.03 0.07 -0.10 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.59) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Father’s 
education 
-0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mother’s 
education 
0.00 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.02 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
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Appendix Table 2.3. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the education l qualifications, market skill, & personality of BCS officers 
(contd.) 
 =1 if 
grade 
of 
SSC 
exam 
is A+ 
Engineering  
graduate 
log real 
income 
in 
previous 
job 
Big 5 
index 
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Father’s 
occupation  
0.07 0.04 -0.17 -0.04 0.05 -0.00 0.08 -0.16 -0.03 
(government) (0.07) (0.04) (0.86) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) 
Father’s 
occupation  
0.06 0.02 0.40 -0.06 0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 0.10** 
(business) (0.08) (0.02) (0.85) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05) 
Mother has job 0.15* -0.04 -0.86 0.02 0.10 0.20* 0.21* -0.39*** 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.70) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Constant 0.83** -0.34 -10.00** 0.05 3.84*** 3.65*** 3.53*** 2.53*** 3.44*** 
 (0.40) (0.22) (4.72) (0.33) (0.53) (0.55) (0.37) (0.61) (0.40) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center where int rviewed were undertaken) and enumerators 
are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix Table 2.4. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the PSM, pro-social behavior, & social preferences of BCS officers 
 PSM 
index 
Interested 
in Policy- 
making 
Commitment 
to pub 
service 
Social 
Justice 
Civic 
duty 
Compassion Self- 
sacrifice 
=1 if Participated 
voluntary and 
charity activities 
=1 if 
Least 
Patient 
=1 if 
Present 
Bias 
=1 if Most 
risk- 
averse 
Altruism 
to poor 
(0-10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post x O 0.26** 0.23 0.29*** -0.05 0.12 0.15 0.12 -0.07 -0.28***  0.04 0.05 1.98*** 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.67) 
Post -0.10 -0.19 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.15** 0.09** -0.08** -0.21* -1.01* 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.53) 
O 0.01 0.19* -0.02 0.03 -0.11** -0.06 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.52 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.70) 
Age -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02* -0.01 0.02** -0.01 -0.01** -0.03** -0.05 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
Male 0.17*** 0.38*** 0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.35*** -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.13 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.35) 
Raised in urban -0.12** 0.00 -0.14*** -0.07** 0.02 -0.06 -0.11** -0.01 -0.08* 0.00 -0.10 0.63** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.32) 
Father’s education -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) 
Mother’s education 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01* 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) 
Father’s occupation  0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.07 0.11* 0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.05* -0.14** 0.31 
(government) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.42) 
Father’s occupation  0.06 -0.11 0.18*** -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15** 0.14 
(business) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.45) 
Mother has job 0.01 -0.11 -0.16* 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.18* -0.14 0.05 -0.19 -0.22 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.04) (0.14) (0.58) 
Constant -0.22 4.29*** 3.36*** 3.05*** 3.81*** 2.55*** 4.36***  -0.32 1.40*** 0.41** 1.78*** 7.39*** 
 (0.29) (0.51) (0.45) (0.35) (0.33) (0.43) (0.29) (0.29) (0.38) (0.16) (0.45) (2.50) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center where int rviewed were undertaken) and enumerators 
are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Appendix Table 2.5 Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the education l qualifications, market skill, & personality of Applicant Pool (gender analysis) 
VARIABLES =1 if  grade 
of SSC exam 
is A+ 
Engineer
ing 
graduate 
Log real 
Income 
Big-
five  
Index  
Extraversion  Agreeableness Consciousness Neuroticism  Openness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post  0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.00 0.06 0.11 -0.21 -0.02 0.28* 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.14) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15) 
Post × Male 0.04 0.00 -0.15 -0.06 -0.02 -0.18* 0.20 0.08 -0.32*** 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) 
Age -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Male -0.07 0.08** 0.18* 0.09 0.13 0.01 -0.06 -0.15 0.15** 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) 
Constant 0.69* -0.47** 10.06*** -0.10 3.95*** 3.60*** 3.52*** 2.54*** 3.40*** 
 (0.36) (0.21) (0.52) (0.33) (0.47) (0.53) (0.41) (0.62) (0.42) 
Observations 433 433 221 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 
(1). Male post =Female 
post (p value) 
0.78 0.64 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.11 0.21 0.80  0.04  
(2).Male Pre=Female pre 
(p value) 
0.34 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.91 0.40 0.17 0.03 
(3). (1)-(2) (p value) 0.96 0.74 0.39 0.64 0.74 0.13 0.17 0.65 0.02 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center where int rviewed were undertaken) and enumerators 
are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Other controls are: urban and occupation of father and mother.  
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Appendix Table 2.6. Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the PSM, pro-social behavior, & social preferences of applicant pool (gender analysis) 
VARIABLES PSM 
Index 
Interested 
in policy 
making  
Commitment 
to public 
service  
Social 
Justice 
Civic 
duty  
Compassion  Self-
Sacrifice 
=1 
participated in 
voluntary/char
ity activities 
=1 if 
Least 
patient  
=1 if 
Present 
bias  
=1 if 
most 
risk 
averse 
Altruis
m to 
poor (0-
10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post  0.00 -0.28* 0.21* -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.22*** -0.07 -0.10 -0.31*** -1.09 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (0.81) 
Post × Male -0.04 0.16 -0.09 0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.77 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.06) (0.14) (0.73) 
Age 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02* -0.01 0.02* -0.02 -0.01** -0.03** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Male 0.19** 0.31** 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.38*** -0.14 -0.05 -0.09 -0.22 
 (0.07) (0.14) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.47) 
Constant -0.39 3.93*** 3.30*** 3.00*** 3.83*** 2.52*** 4.30*** -0.23 1.62*** 0.35** 1.68*** 6.00*** 
 (0.30) (0.53) (0.40) (0.31) (0.33) (0.46) (0.27) (0.29) (0.34) (0.17) (0.42) (2.14) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.02 
(1). Male post 
=Female post 
(p value) 
0.39 0.00 0.21 0.32 0.56 0.49 0.60 0.70 0.84 0.40 0.07 0.22 
(2).Male 
Pre=Female 
pre (p value) 
0.01 0.02 0.25 0.63 0.30 0.99 0.22 0.00 0.11 0.32 0.18 0.64 
(3). (1)-(2) (p 
value) 
0.80 0.06 0.15 0.50 0.38 0.57 0.33 0.02 0.50 0.27 0.03 0.20 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center where int rviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * *p<0. Other controls are: urban and occupation of father and mother. 
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Appendix Table 2.7 Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the education l qualifications, market skill, & personality of BCS officers (gender analysis) 
          
VARIABLES =1 if  grade of 
SSC exam is 
A+ 
Engineering 
graduate 
Log real 
Income 
Big-five  
Index  
Extraversion  Agreeableness Consciousness Neuroticism  Openness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post×O 0.15 0.16* 0.42*** 0.10 -0.28* -0.13 0.33* 0.16 -0.26 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.23) (0.19) 
Post×O×Male 0.04 0.07 0.02 -0.17* -0.02 -0.08 -0.15 -0.26* 0.06 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.09) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.13) 
Post  0.02 -0.02 -0.22** -0.03 0.13* 0.03 -0.13 0.04 0.11 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.18) (0.14) 
O 0.08 0.02 -0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.11* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.06) 
Age -0.02* 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Male -0.05 0.08*** 0.15 0.10** 0.13 -0.04 0.01 -0.1 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant 0.87** -0.34 10.21*** 0.01 3.87*** 3.65*** 3.45*** 2.43*** 3.55*** 
 (0.40) (0.23) (0.54) (0.32) (0.49) (0.58) (0.37) (0.59) (0.41) 
Observations 433 433 221 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 
(1). Male post =Female post 
(p value) 
0.11 0.99 0.05   0.58 0.02 0.89 0.46  0.78
  
0.49   
(2).Male Pre=Female pre (p 
value) 
0.44 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.68 0.23 0.12 0.01 
(3). (1)-(2) (p value) 0.32 0.63 0.00 0.59 0.14 0.97 0.89 0.75 0.39 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center where int rviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Other controls are: urban and occupation of father and mother. 
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Appendix Table 2.8 Effect of the 2015 pay scale reform on the PSM, pro-social behavior, & social preferences of BCS officers (gender analysis) 
VARIABLES PSM 
Index 
Intereste
d in 
policy 
making  
Commitmen
t to public 
service  
Social 
Justice 
Civic 
duty  
Compassio
n  
Self- 
Sacrifice  
=1 
participated in 
voluntary/char
ity activities  
=1 if 
Least 
patient 
=1 if 
Presen
t bias  
=1 if 
most 
risk 
averse 
Altruis
m to 
poor (0-
10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post ×O 0.36***  0.32 0.35** 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.04 -0.38***  0.12* 0.01 1.76* 
 (0.14) (0.22) (0.15) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.91) 
Post×Male×
O 
-0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.18 0.13 -0.12* 0.05 0.33 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.70) 
Post  -0.10 -0.19 0.06 -0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.16** 0.10**
*  
-
0.08** 
-0.21* -0.98* 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.14) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.51) 
O 0.01 0.18* -0.04 0.04 -
0.11** 
-0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.06 0.06 0.50 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.71) 
Age -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02** -0.01 -
0.01** 
-0.03* -0.05 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) 
Male 0.19***  0.41*** 0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.36*** -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 0.12 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.38) 
Constant -0.25 4.18*** 3.42*** 3.00**
* 
3.80**
* 
2.56*** 4.39*** -0.23 1.44**
* 
0.42** 1.72**
* 
7.33*** 
 (0.28) (0.52) (0.42) (0.33) (0.35) (0.44) (0.26) (0.28) (0.39) (0.17) (0.47) (2.40) 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.06 
(1). Male post 
=Female post 
(p value) 
0.18 0.11 0.09 0.50 0.30 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.98 0.04 
(2).Male 
Pre=Female 
pre (p value) 
0.00 0.02 0.26 0.57 0.52 0.82 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.45 0.18 0.71 
(3). (1)-(2) (p 
value) 
0.04 0.60 0.05 0.65 0.23 0.24 0.03 0.72 0.00 0.64 0.72 0.14 
Notes: The standard error were clustered at the survey locations (districts and training center where int rviewed were undertaken) and enumerators are reported in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Other controls are: urban and occupation of father and mother. 
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Appendix 2.A: Variables 
 Age: Calculated from self-reported birthdate  
 Male (male=1, 0 otherwise),  
 Married (married=1, 0 otherwise)  
 Raised in an urban area: equals 1 if the applicant raised in the district and capital area 
up to secondary education. 
 Years of schooling: Measured by years. In the context of Bangladesh education system, 
completed primary school=5 years, completed secondary school=10 years, College 
graduate=12 years, university graduate=16 years, and post graduate=17 years. 
 Father’s education: Schooling years of father  
 Mother’s education: Schooling years of mother 
 Father’s occupation (business): equals 1 if the father of the respondent is in business. 
 Father’s occupation (government): equals 1 if the father is a first/second class 
government officer 
 Mother has job: equals 1 if mother work outside the home for a wage.  
 Highest grade in the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination: equals 1 if the 
individual got grade A+ (90-100% marks) in the secondary school certificate 
examination.  
 Enrolled in coaching center: equals 1 if the applicants/officers took BCS examination 
preparation in the coaching center.  
 Engineering major: equals 1 if the individual graduted from the engineering faculty of 
a technical university.  
 Quota Privilege: This variable takes 1 if the applicants have quota privilege for getting 
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BCS job and zero otherwise. 
 Took BCS exam in 2013: It equals 1 if one applied for BCS exam in 2013 and zero 
otherwise. 
 Experience in Private sector jobs: It equals 1 if the applicants/officers worked for 
private sector jobs before applying to the civil service examination and zero otherwise. 
 The Big-five Personality Traits: The Big-Five factor model developed by John (1990) 
contains 44 items, which are in turn divided into five dimensions of personality: 
extraversion; agreeableness; consciousness; neuroticism, and openness (Almlund et al., 
2011). The responses were collected on 5-point Likert scales, showing the extent to 
which the applicants and officers agreed or disagreed with the statements. In this 
dissertation, a shorter list of questions containing 10 questions, with 2 questions per 
dimension was used following Donato et al. (2017) and Rammstedt & John (2007).  
 Extraversion: Extravert represents the traits of an individual related to activity and 
energy, mainly sociable (Benet-Martínez & John, 1998). Computed as the average 
response to the two questions related to extraversion.  
I like to interact and talk with people. 
I am sometime shy and unable to communicate with other easily (Reversed). 
Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.4 
 Agreeableness: Agreeableness represents the traits of n individual related to altruism, 
tender mindedness, trust and modesty (Benet-Martínez & John, 1998). Computed as 
the average response to the two questions related to Agreeableness.  
I like to cooperate with others although it is difficult. 
I tend to find fault with others (reversed). 
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Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.12 
 Conscientiousness: Conscientiousness represents the raits of an individual related to 
hardworking, organized, responsible and goal directed behavior (Benet-Martínez & 
John, 1998). Computed as the average response to the two questions related to 
extraversion. 
I do any task with regard to every detail: not superficial and partial. 
Anybody can depend on me (in general).  
Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.4 
 Neuroticism: Neuroticism represents the traits of the individual related to anxiety, 
sadness, irritability, nervousness, emotional instabili y (Benet-Martínez & John, 1998). 
Computed as the average response to the two questions related to Neuroticism.  
I can be tensed a lot in any matter. 
I am emotionally stable, not easily upset (reversed). 
Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.3 
 Openness: Individual having openness behavior shows openness to new aesthetic, 
cultural and intellectual experiences (Dal Bo et al., 2013). Computed as the average 
response to the two questions related to Openness.  
I like to think deeply or carefully about any task. 
I Prefer work that is routine (reversed). 
Cronbach’s alpha for these two questions: 0.4 
 Big-Five Personality Index: It is an equally weighted average of the z-score of each 
module of the Big-Five Personality inventory (see dtails in Alam and Kijima, 2020). 
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In the case of Neuroticism module, the reverse score was considered as it is a negative 
trait (See more details in Benet-Martínez and John, 1998). 
 PSM (Public Service Motivation) index: To construct PSM index 12 statements from 
the 40 statements of Perry’s 1996 scale of Public service motivation (Perry, 1996) were 
elicited, and created an equally weighted average of the z-scores of each module of the 
PSM.  
 Attraction to Policy Making: Computed as the averag response to the following two 
questions. 
I am interested in making public programs and policies which are beneficial for the 
country. 
I like to share my views on public policies with others. 
 Commitment to the Public Interest: Computed as the average response to the following 
two questions. 
An official's obligation to the public should always come before loyalty to superiors. 
I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if 
it harmed my interests. 
 Social Justice: Computed as the average response to th f llowing two questions.  
I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others ven if it means I will be ridiculed. 
I do not believe that government can do much to make society fairer (reversed). 
 Civic Duty: Computed as the average response to the following two questions. 
I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic affairs no matter how busy they 
are. 
I have an obligation to look after those less well off. 
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 Compassion: Computed as the average response to the following two questions. 
I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to 
help themselves (reversed). 
It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. 
 Self-Sacrifice: Computed as the average response to the following two questions.  
I believe in putting duty before self. 
Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. 
 Participated in volunteering or charity activities: qual 1 if the individual did voluntary 
works or charity activities before applying in the civil service, 0 otherwise. 
 Patience and Present Bias: To measure the patience and present bias, hypothetical 4 
questions were asked.  
• Q1: If he buys a shirt and wins a prize, he can receive the prize money 2000 BDT 
instantly or 2500 BDT after one month. Would he like to wait for one month? 
Yes/No. Q2: If Q1=No, The respondent is asked if he is offered 3000 BDT after 
one month, would he like to wait for one month? Yes/No. 
• Q3: If he buys a shirt and wins a prize, he can receive the prize money 2000 after 
one month or 2500 after two months. Would he like to wait for two months? 
Yes/No. Q4: If Q3=No, The respondent is asked if he is offered 3000 BDT after 
two months, would he like to wait for two month? Yes/No. By using the response 
to Q2, if one did not agree to wait for two months, they were considered as 
snsidere ree to wIf one answered Yes in Q1 and No in Q3, or Yes in Q2 and No 
in Q4, they were identified as 1 and No in Q3, 
 
51 
 
 Most-risk averse: To measure the risk taking behavior, the respondents were asked 3 
lottery questions to choose (A) or (B): (1) (A) 2000 BDT with certainty or (B) 50% 
chance of winning 4000 and 50% chance of zero, (2) (A) 2000 BDT with certainty or 
(B) 50% chance of winning 8000 and 50% chance of zero, (3) (A) 2000 BDT with 
certainty or (B) 50% chance of winning 10000 and 50% chance of zero. Those who did 
not want to take the risk in lottery 3 are identified as the most risk-averse.  
 Altruism: In this article, altruism were defined as the level of the unselfishness of the 
respondents to a poor family. To do so, the respondent is asked a hypothetical question: 
if the respondent is given 10 tokens (1 token values 100 BDT), how many tokens does 
he want to give to poor families and how many tokens does he want to keep for himself. 
Those who agreed to give more tokens to poor families are considered as more altruistic. 
 Consumer Price Index (CPI) of Bangladesh: CPI data were collected from World Bank 
(2017b). In this regard, the previous wages of the last job were converted to real value 
at the price level of 2017. BCS officers who applied for the exam in 2012, 2013, and 
2014 were appointed to the first post 2.5 years later. So the income of previous job 
before joining to BCS was measured at price level of 2014, 2015, and 2017, respectively. 
CPI in 2014, 2015, and 2017 is 136.05, 152.32, and 161.14, respectively.  
 Hypothetical questions on preferences (Patience, Risk averse and Altruistic 
behavior) 
 
Now vs. 1 month (2000 vs 2500) 
1. Suppose you bought a soap and you have just won a prize. The prize is 2000 BDT. If you 
wait for 30 days, you can receive 2500 BDT (you will receive money in 30 days for sure). 
Would you like to wait for 30 days? 1=Yes 0=No.  
 If the answer is yes, please skip the questions 2, 3, if no, please answer next question. 
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Now vs. 1 month (2000 vs 3000) 
2. The same scenario as above, but now if you wait for 30 days, you can receive 3000 BDT 
(you will receive money in 30 days for sure). Would you like to wait for 30 days? 1=Yes, 0=No, 
If the answer is yes, please skip the question 3, If the answer is no, Please ask next question. 
3. The same scenario as above, but now how much do you need for you to wait for 30 days, 
instead of receiving a prize today? (Please write the amount) ………….BDT 
1 month vs. 2 months (2000 vs. 2500) 
4. Suppose you bought a shampoo and you have just won a prize. The prize is 2000 BDT and 
you can get the prize in 1 month from now. If you wait for 2 months (instead of receiving in 1 
month from now), you can receive 2500 BDT. Would you like to wait for an additional 1 month 
(2 months from now)? 1=Yes 0=No 
If the answer is yes, please skip the questions 5 and 6, if no, please ask next question  
1 month vs. 2 months (2000 vs. 3000) 
5. The same scenario as above, but now if you wait for 2 months, you can receive 3000BDT. 
Would you like to wait for an additional 1 month (2 months from now)? 1=Yes 0=No. If the 
answer is yes, please skip the questions 6, if the answer is no, please answer next question (6) 
6.The same scenario as above, but now how much do you need for you to wait for an additional 
1 month (2 months from now), instead of receiving the prize in 1 month?.........BDT 
7. Now you have a partner X. Suppose you are given 10 tokens by a charity organization. Each 
token you keep is worth 100 BDT, while each token your partner receives is worth 300 BDT. 
You are independent to distribute the tokens (i.e. you can donate to your partner or you can 
keep it for you). How many tokens will you give to y ur partner and how many tokens will 
you keep for you? 
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When Your Partner is your family member, For Partner: …………For You:……….. 
When Your Partner is a stranger, For Partner: …………For You:…………………….. 
When Your Partner is a stranger but poor people, For Partner: ……For you………..….. 
8.1 Suppose I were to offer you a choice between the following two choices: Choice A: 2000 
BDT with certainty. Choice B: A business with a 50% chance of winning 4000 BDT and a 50% 
chance of winning nothing. Which would you choose, Choice 1=A or 2= B? 
8.2 Suppose I were to offer you a choice between th following two choices: Choice A: 2000 
BDT with certainty. Choice B: A business with a 50% chance of winning 8000 BDT and a 50% 
chance of winning nothing. Which would you choose, Choice 1= A or 2= B? 
8.3 Suppose I were to offer you a choice between the following two choices: Choice A: 2000 
BDT with certainty. Choice B: A business with a 50% chance of winning 10,000 BDT and a 
50% chance of winning nothing. Which would you choose, Choice1=A or 2=B? 
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Appendix 2.B 
 
Reform in the labor market situation: 
 
During 2010-2013, labor force participation has risen ubstantially. In this time, female labor 
force participation rate has been increased compared to male. Labor force having tertiary 
education was increased but still low. Real wage increase rate was stable during 2010-2013. 
Interestingly, labor force participation in agriculture has been decreased but increase in the 
manufacturing sector, this is may be due to rapid growth of Ready Made Garment sectors (ADB 
and ILO, 2016). However, considering the labor reform issue, it was found that   the Bangladesh 
government enacted Labor Act, 2006, subsequently it was amended in 2013. However, the law 
was enacted mainly for ensuring right of the workers (labor) in the manufacturing sectors 
(Ministry of Labor and Employment, n.d). As BCS officers are not the potential candidates in 
the manufacturing sector as labor, this reform might have no effect on the BCS applicant pool.  
Reform in the Education Sector: 
 
In Bangladesh, after the liberation in 1971, the Bangl desh government have taken initiatives 
to reform the education sector several times. First attempt was undertaken by forming the 
Qudrat-E Khoda Commission in 1974. This commission suggested to change the traditional 
memorizing system education as well as to strengthe t  research activities. Subsequently, in 
1979 Jatiyo Shikkha Upodeshta Parishad (National Education Advisory Council), in 1997 
Jatiyo Shikka Nity Pranayan Committee (National Education policy Preparation Committee), 
in 2002 Bari Commission, in 2003 Moniruzzaman Mia Commission, and finally in 2009 again 
Moniruzzaman Commision were formed, and these commission mainly emphasized on the 
improvement of the quality of higher education. However, the recommendations of these 
commissions are rarely implemented by the government. In sum, during the pay scale reform 
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(2014-2015 financial year) and the time when 35th batch (took exam after the reform) entered 
to high school/higher secondary school, higher education (2008-2010),  there was no major 
change in education system (Hossain & Mohammad Khan, 2015; Khan, Rana, & Haque, 2014). 
 
Reform in the recruitment and pay scale: 
We do not find any other reform and policy changes which could affect applicant pool of BCS 
after 2015 other than pay scale reform. However, a new rule as Bangladesh Civil Service (Age, 
qualification and Examination for direct recruitment) Rules, 2014 were approved by the 
government in September 18, 2014. Compared to previous rules ordered in 1982, there was not 
any major changes in the new Rules ordered in 2014. In the new rules, 200 marks for the 
preliminary exam were introduced and previously it was 100 (Establishment Division, 1982; 
Ministry of Public Administration, 2014). The lates reform was on the pay scale reform in 
2015. There were not any major changes in the application and selection procedures.  
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Chapter 3 
Incentives to Improve Government Extension Agent Performance: A 
Randomized Control Trial in Bangladesh  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Agriculture is an important sector for a developing economy, as it is a major source of 
employment, income, and foreign exchange (de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Suri, 2017). However, 
farmers in developing countries face many obstacles in nhancing productivity, such as a lack 
of access to new agricultural technologies (Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder, 1991; de Janvry 
et al., 2017; Jack, 2013; Lee, 2005). Although extension services are publicly provided through 
agents in developing countries, one extension agent must cover 500–5,000 farmers (Davis, 
2008). Under this situation, farmers rarely have adquate and timely access to relevant advice 
(Anderson and Feder, 2007). Therefore, efficiencies in the public agricultural extension system 
must be improved.  
Although there is anecdotal evidence about the low morale of public agricultural 
extension agents due to low salaries and insufficient supervision, few studies rigorously 
examine whether incentives and monitoring can enhance service delivery. Empirical literature 
on public service delivery in health and education sectors has found performance pay (Basinga 
et al., 2011; Mbiti et al., 2019; Muralidharan and Sundaraman, 2011), social recognition 
(Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack, 2014: Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee, 2014), and monitoring with 
penalties (Banerjee et al., 2008; Dhaliwal and Hanna, 2017) to be effective. However, other 
studies found negative consequences of performance pay, which changes behaviors to focus 
on work related with incentives (Glewwe et al., 2010) and to manipulate records to avoid 
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punishment (Dhaliwal and Hanna, 2017). Therefore, dtermining effective incentives to 
increase service delivery by public sector workers is inconclusive.  
In rural Bangladesh, more than 87% of the population depends on agriculture for 
income (World Bank, 2016, 2017a). In 2016, the Bangl desh government formulated a new 
agricultural extension policy to ensure sufficient services for all farms. Under this policy, 
programs were launched that aimed to increase agricultural productivity, crop diversification, 
and cultivation of cash crops. To address climate change and ensure a clean environment, the 
government emphasized the diffusion of green technology (i.e., natural fertilizers versus 
chemical fertilizers) (DAE, 2018). To implement a new policy successfully, there is an urgent 
need to improve agricultural extension worker performance. By conducting a randomized 
control trial (RCT) to provide tournament-type incetives to public agricultural extension 
officers in Bangladesh, this chapter explores three qu stions: (1) Does introducing incentives 
to the public agricultural extension system help increase service delivery? (2) If yes, what kind 
of incentive, financial or non-financial, works better? (3) Is increasing monitoring as effective 
as providing incentives? 
The results show that financial incentives, non-financial incentives, and increased 
monitoring have positive effects on service delivery, and their effectiveness is not significantly 
different on average. However, for poorly performing agents, increased monitoring has an 
advantage in improving performance. An analysis of the heterogeneous treatment effect 
indicates that the effect is greater among agents in off ces with high variations in initial 
performance than among those with low variations. 
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This chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. First, considering the diffusion 
of new agricultural technologies, the existing studies examine the effectiveness of farmer-to-
farmer extension services and information sharing (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; BenYishay and 
Mobarak, 2019; Conley and Udry, 2010; Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu, 2017; Krishnan and 
Patnam, 2013; Munshi, 2004; Shikuku, 2019; Takahashi, Mano, and Otsuka, 2019; Tripp, 
Wijertne, and Piyadasa, 2005) and how to select key farmers who can widely diffuse 
technology information (Beaman et al., 2018; Emerick and Dar, 2020). This chapter examines 
how to enhance service delivery by providing incentives to public agricultural extension agents. 
Recent studies focus on farmer-to-farmer extension ervices (key farmers to ordinary farmers) 
and the role of social networks (e.g., neighbors, fiends, peer farmers, and relatives) in 
disseminating new agricultural technology information.  
Second, this chapter examines the effects of incentives on service deliveries by public 
sector workers. Some empirical studies examine the ffect of financial incentives, non-financial 
incentives, and monitoring on test scores, absenteeism, and the service delivery of health 
workers (Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee, 2014; Banerjee et al., 2008; Dhaliwal and Hanna, 2017; 
Mbiti et al., 2019). This chapter also indicates that incentives given to agricultural extension 
officers increase service delivery and tests the eff ctiveness of financial incentives, non-
financial incentives, and increased monitoring.  
Third, this chapter empirically tests the effect ofrank-order tournaments on 
performance. Although the financial incentive introduced and examined by many RCT studies 
is performance pay, a reward system based on a rank-order tournament is used by many 
companies to compensate employees due to ease of implementation. Empirical studies examine 
the effect of the rank-order tournament on employee performance based on cases in the private 
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sector of developed countries (Conyon, Peck, and Sadler, 2001; DeVaro, 2006; Eriksson, 2007; 
Knoeber and Thurman, 1994). So far, the literature is absent in this regard that examines the 
effect of the rank-order tournament in the public se tor of a developing country.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the institutional 
background of agricultural extension services. Section 3.3 discusses the methodology, 
experimental design, and empirical methods. Section 3.4 reports the descriptive statistics, 
baseline balance, estimation results, robustness of evidence, and discusses the “do no harm” 
principle for experimentation. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes and presents directions for future 
research. 
3.2. Institutional background and public agricultural extension services in Bangladesh 
3.2.1 Institutional arrangement for agricultural extension services 
 
The Department of Agriculture Extension (DAE) is the central public organization that 
provides agricultural crop extension services to all farmers in Bangladesh. The department has 
2,000 extension personnel (managerial-level civil service officers) and 14,092 field-level 
extension agents stationed in 492 upazila (sub-district) agriculture offices (Huber and Davis, 
2017). District offices act as a controlling office for upazila agriculture offices, while the 
upazila agriculture offices deliver extension services at the field level. The deputy director 
(DD)19 and upazila agriculture officer (UAO) lead the district- and sub-district-level agriculture 
offices, respectively.  
                                                 
19 Deputy Director (DD) is appointed from mid-level Bangladesh Civil Service (Agriculture) cadre 
officers who are recruited under the competitive civil service exam. Their post at an entry level is 
Agriculture Extension Officer (AEO) (9th grade). After 5-8 years, AEOs get promotion as Upazila 
Agriculture Officer (UAO) and become head of Upazil Agriculture office (6th grade). After 10-15 years, 
UAOs get promotion as Deputy Director (head of the District agriculture offices).  
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A field-level extension agent, known as a sub-assistant agriculture officer (SAAO), is 
responsible for delivering extension services to 1,200 farmer families (one block) on average. 
SAAOs are permanent and pensioned employees (ASIRP, 2003; Huber and Davis, 2017; 
Rashid and Qijie, 2016). Regional agriculture offices, along with district and upazila offices, 
are responsible for SAAOs’ promotion and transfer within the region (DAE, 2018). The 
performance report of SAAOs is sent to the DAE and Ministry of Agriculture via the district 
agriculture office. 
In Bangladesh, public agriculture extension services ar  provided by group discussions, 
field demonstrations, field visits, motivational tours, training for contact farmers, a celebration 
of field days, individual consultation with farmers, farmer field schools, and electronic media 
and devices (radio, television, phone) (DAE, 2018; Haque, 2011). It is common for SAAOs to 
provide extension services through field demonstrations, individual consultancy, and field 
visits with farmers. Generally, the contents and types of extension services provided by SAAOs 
vary based on agricultural seasons and locations. At the beginning of each season, the DAE 
sets targets for each type of extension service for the district agriculture offices. District offices 
specify the targets to each upazila agriculture office, which in turn assign targets to block-level 
officers.  
Beyond the government, NGOs and private organizations provide extension services to 
farmers (ASIRP, 2003; Nippard, 2014). NGOs deliver extension services to micro-credit 
clients to bolster the poultry business and social forestry. Private organizations providing 
extension services are limited to selling seed and fertilizers, promoting fish hatchery, and 
extending irrigation facilities to farmers (ASIRP, 2003). Thus, private organizations’ extension 
services are not substitutes for public services. 
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3.2.2 Incentives and monitoring in the Public sector agricultural extension services 
 
The minimum qualification for an SAAO is a diploma in agriculture. To recruit SAAOs, 
the DAE advertises in the national paper, which state  the location (district) of vacancy where 
applicants reside. The selection is based on written and oral examinations. Once selected, 
extension officers are posted to districts other than their home district. After a few months, 
extension officers are posted in their home districts, some even in their village. The salary is 
fixed and increases based on job tenure and promotin. Prior to 2015, when pay scale reform 
was implemented, the entry-level salary of an SAAO was lower than the average income for a 
similar occupation (BBS, 2017). In 2015, pay became more than doubled and high in the rural 
setting.20 
Extension worker absenteeism is common.21 Insufficient transportation budgets are 
believed to be a major challenge for extension agents; however, this should not be a problem 
if they reside in their jurisdictional area. It is common for female extension workers to reside 
outside their jurisdictional village after marriage. Due to social norms and customs (purdah 
system), it is not easy for female farmers to work with male extension workers. To solve this 
dilemma, in 1996, the government enacted a policy appointing female extension workers to 
provide extension services to rural women. However, in a national level survey on agricultural 
                                                 
20 Extension workers tend to work hard to achieve the target on projects from donors, because they 
receive an honorarium, which is partly determined by days of training participated and field days 
arranged in addition to their salary from the project. From a project, SAAOs receive an honorarium of 
around 450-500 BDT (about 6-6.5 USD) per day. This suggests that financial incentives based on 
performance can be an effective policy instrument for improving extension worker performance. 
21 Workers residing outside their jurisdictional block is the main reason for absenteeism. Though all 
extension workers must remain in their jurisdiction block, there is no enforcement of this policy (Key 
Informant Interview, 2017). 
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extension coverage, ASRIP (2003) found that only 18% of female farmers knew about 
government extension services. 
Promotion prospects for SAAOs are limited. After 20 years of work, an SAAO (11th 
grade) can apply for a promotion to assistant agriculture extension officer (AAEO) (10th grade). 
Based on performance, both UAO and DD nominate SAAOs for foreign- and national-level 
trainings and for the Best SAAO of the Year award (DAE, 2018).22 Employer recognition is 
important for workers’ careers (Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I., Tirole, J., 1999). This incentive 
may not ensure promotions or privileges while extensio  officers enjoy the honor. Nonetheless, 
the Best SAAO of the Year is selected annually, and o ly one extension officer receives the 
award. Therefore, current incentives may not be effctive in improving SAAO performance, 
on average.   
The performance of SAAOs is monitored in two ways: infrequent and planned block 
inspections and weekly meetings (referred to as weekly conferences). Every month, district- 
and upazila-level officers announce an inspection tour. However, according to key informant 
interviews, geographical dispersion makes monitoring all blocks difficult for officers. 
Controlling officers hardly maintain a tour plan. When extension officers are older than 
monitoring officers (UAO/DD), monitoring officers have difficulty to encourage extension 
officers to achieve the target.  
                                                 
22 In a field diary, SAAOs keep a record of extension services (i.e., how many farmers communicated for 
specific extension services and how many of them adopted those services). To select the Best SAAO of the 
Year, both UAO and Deputy Director (DD) from distric  Agricultural Office inspect the blocks of the 
candidates and physically verify the performance repo ted (DAE, 2018). The best SAAO of the division 
(nation) receives the crest from the divisional officers (prime minister). 
 
63 
 
All SAAOs for each upazila agriculture office are to attend the weekly meeting and to 
record their weekly achievements in specific books maintained in the upazila agriculture 
offices. If the performance is unsatisfactory, UAOs use the weekly meeting to encourage 
SAAOs to increase service deliveries.23 However, SAAOs do not lose their jobs nor are they 
suspended if they do not achieve the targets. While t ere is a policy to issue a showcause letter 
when SAAOs have a low achievement rate, it is rarely issued by the UAO. During the weekly 
meeting, UAOs can mention, in front of colleagues, low-performing SAAOs who do not 
achieve the target and request that they must improve performance.  
 Often, SAAOs strive to achieve seasonal targets at he end of a season. This makes it 
difficult for upazila and district offices to conduct inspection in all the SAAOs to visit/check 
the status of extension services in the field by SAAOs, especially as this is when upazila and 
district agriculture offices are preparing the next season’s plan. Therefore, changing the target 
period from the season (4 months) to each month can m ke monitoring and tracking more 
efficient and may enhance work performance of SAAOs.  
In summary, a key problem to providing extension servic s efficiently is poorly 
motivated SAAOs. A scheme exists to enhance SAAO performance through awards, training 
opportunities, and promotion prospects. However, this may not be effective in encouraging 
poor-performing SAAOs to achieve their target, since it is rare for them to be fired or severely 
punished due to poor performance. Therefore, encouraging poor performers is a major issue in 
the Bangladesh public sector. 
                                                 
23 When there is important message from the DAE and mi istry, district-level officers join the meeting 
to deliver a motivational speech for SAAOs and share the latest directives (DAE, 2018). The 
performance of SAAOs is also tracked by the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) written by AEOs, 
which is submitted to UAO (DAE, 2018). Any poor performances indicated in the ACR affects 
promotion prospects. 
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3. 3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Experimental design 
   
Based on the institutional background, this chapter aims to motivate poor-performing 
SAAOs to enhance service delivery by providing tournament-type incentives. Tournament-
type rewards, rather than performance pay, align with the current DAE system, which is also 
tournament type (i.e., Best SAAO of the Year), and is easy for the DAE to adopt and adapt. 
The weekly meetings were utilized where SAAOs fill a service delivery diary. In the meeting, 
annual or seasonal targets (the number of farmers to whom SAAOs provide information on 
specific practices and technologies) set by upazila agriculture offices are announced. Adding 
tournament-type rewards each month to a weekly meeting mphasizes the monthly target rather 
than the seasonal target. The incentive’s effect on SAAOs’ service delivery is determined. 
According to tournament theories (Connelly et al., 2014; Eriksson, 2007), more able 
players tend to exert more effort to win the prize than less able players. For enhancing less able 
players' performance, tournament organizers handicap (restrict) more able players through 
rules (Knoeber and Thurman, 1994). In the experiment, it was tested whether the impact of 
handicapping better performers helps improve poor performers' service delivery. 
 Tournament theory also predicts that high variation of initial performance among 
competitors leads to increase in service delivery among more able officers. In contrast, low 
variation of initial performance among competitors re ults in similar effects on all competitors. 
Additionally, experimental setting, winning probability is different by the size of the office, 
since the number of winners from each office is same. Therefore, the effect of the experiment 
on the performance of the poor performers should differ by the initial variation of performance 
among competitors and by number of officers within an office. 
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Rewards can be financial (cash) or non-financial (honor as positive and possibly 
censure as negative). Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Frey (1993) theoretically show that tighter 
monitoring motivates workers to increase effort in he short term, but it is not the case in the 
long term. Demougin and Fluet (2001) show that low-powered financial incentives with precise 
monitoring are effective in increasing worker effort. Since the comparative effectiveness of 
financial and non-financial incentives remains understudied, determining which is more 
effective in the public agriculture sector in Bangladesh is the empirical question.24 The effect 
of four incentives (Fame, Money1, Money2, and Inspection) on SAAO’s effort is evaluated.  
 This chapter examines all SAAOs working in 40 upazila agriculture offices in ten 
districts of four divisions.25 After sorting upazilas by division and district, eight upazila 
agriculture offices are assigned to each treatment and control group. Since an upazila is 
equivalent to a sub-district and there were no district-level events and trainings during the 
experiment and evaluation period, it is unlikely for SAAOs in control offices to be discouraged 
by not receiving incentives. In all study offices, including the control offices, UAOs asked 
SAAOs to indicate the number of farmers they provided information in the month prior to the 
weekly meeting. UAOs also requested them to achieve a monthly target rather than seasonal. 
                                                 
24 One exception is Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee (2014), which compared the effectiveness of financial 
and non-financial incentives on public health worker p rformance in Zambia. Non-financial incentives 
(social recognition) rather than financial incentives (commission on sales) were effective to motivate 
health workers to sell more. 
25 From October to mid-November 2017, another survey on SAAOs were conducted in the same four 
divisions covering 11 districts (2-3 districts from each division). In this survey, four upazilas were 
selected in each district. In each upazila agricultura  office, the list of SAAOs were prepared who were 
hired around 2015 (2011-2018) and randomly selected 280 SAAOs (5-10 officers from each office). 
This survey contains detailed information on SAAOs. To select four divisions and 11 districts, the 
divisions and districts affected by floods in 2017 and districts whose cropping patters were different 
due to topographical reasons (wetland and hilly) were dropped first. In these flood-affected areas, 
rehabilitation programs for farmers were undertaken rather than regular extension services. One upazila 
office refused to participate, resulting in 40 offices studied. In the analysis, SAAOs who did not work 
in the sample office in the previous season were excluded. 
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This makes the experiment officially implemented, which is crucial for SAAOs participation 
in the experiment.26 
At the beginning of the first weekly meeting in Janu ry 2018, UAOs requested SAAOs 
to furnish complete information on service delivery in December 2017. This was considered 
the initial performance before the experiment. At the beginning of the first weekly meeting in 
February 2018, UAOs requested the same for January. After calculating the performance based 
on service delivery in December 2017 and January 2018, UAOs selected the best (or worst) 
two SAAOs in the office.27  
For Fame and Money1 treatments, the two best performers are selected based on the 
highest percentage increase in service deliveries in one month. For Money2, the two best 
performers are selected based on the highest number of s vices delivered in one month. For 
Inspection, the two worst performers are selected based on the lowest percentage increase in 
service deliveries in one month.28 To motivate initially poor-performing officers, foll wing 
tournament theory prediction, good performers were handicapped before the experiment in 
Fame, Money1, and Inspection, bringing low performers an advantage. It is unclear if 
handicapping better performers has negative effects on their efforts a priori. Average and 
heterogeneous treatment effects for poor- and better-performing officers were estimated. By 
                                                 
26 Since subjects of this chapter are incumbent public extension officers, official support from the DAE 
were needed. A senior officer from the DAE were hired. Letters were sent to all sampled upazila 
agriculture officers for their consent to conduct the experiment. All sampled upazila agriculture offices 
indicated their interest to participate in the experim nt. During the experiment announcement, 
enumerators were present in agriculture offices. Enumerators were trained how UAOs make 
announcements, and AEOs convinced SAAOs to participa e so that the experiment was properly 
conducted in all offices. 
27 Detailed explanation on how to calculate the servic  delivery (performance) is provided in the 
Appendix 3.B. 
28 Bengali scripts were prepared for all treatment and control offices. The English translation is attached 
in Appendix 3.A. 
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comparing the impact of Money1 and Money2 on poor pe formers, the effectiveness of 
handicapping better performers in improving the performance of poor performers was tested. 
For the Fame treatment, the UAO announced that he/she would select the two best 
SAAOs and send those names to the district offices informing the DD that they are the two 
best. SAAOs desiring to be promoted to UAO make more efforts to improve performance.  
For the Inspection treatment, the UAO announced that he/she would select the two worst 
SAAOs to be inspected by the DD (Deputy Director). As indicated above, regular inspection 
is conducted by Agriculture Extension Officers (AEOs) and UAOs (Upazila Agriculture 
Officers), not DDs. Inspection by the DD is rare and implies severe punishment (censure) for 
SAAO's poor performance. Unlike other treatments, the Inspection treatment reveals 
information about the worst two SAAOs in the office. To avoid censure and/or to achieve 
higher career goals, SAAOs try to avoid being select d as the worst. Furthermore, being labeled 
as the worst can induce shame.  
In the Money1 and Money2 treatments, the UAO announced that he/she would select 
the two best SAAOs and explained that a foreign univers ty, in partnership with the upazila 
agriculture office, would provide monetary incentives to them. The rewards were 3,000 BDT 
(about 40 USD) for the best performer and 1,000 BDT (about 12 USD) for the second best. 
The monthly salary of SAAOs is 16,000 BDT; thus, this monetary incentive was significant.  
The timing of the rewards and their certainty are different under each treatment. For 
example, the reward for Money1 and Money2 is provided immediately after the selection. The 
reward for Fame (future promotion) is uncertain and provided more than 10 years after the 
experiment. Consideration of a new incentive differs the treatment effect. Therefore, using the 
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SAAOs’ preferences, such as present biasness and risk aversion, the heterogeneous treatment 
effect on performance was tested.29  
Since performance measures (see details in Appendix-3.B) are self-reported service 
deliveries, SAAOs might overstate their service delivery data to receive the reward or avoid an 
inspection by higher authority. The over-reporting problem is unlikely, as UAOs warned the 
SAAOs that they would issue a showcause letter for over reporting. Need to mention that as 
the service deliveries are easily visible in the field, UAOs can check it during their inspection. 
After collecting data, all the upazila agriculture offices checked the data whether there were 
any over-stated service delivery data by the SAAOs. Be ides, traditionally, upazila agriculture 
office collect self-reported service deliveries data of SAAOs in every week, and it is expected 
SAAOs do not provide over-stated service deliveries data. At least in the context of public 
sector, it is well practiced that when controlling officer order seriously to the sub-ordinate not 
to provide any false information (example: service delivery data in this research context), sub-
ordinate follow that order seriously.  
3.3.2 Estimation model  
 
 McKenzie (2012) indicates an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) estimation of 
treatment effects is better than difference-in-difference (DID) estimation when autocorrelation 
is low. In this chapter, the autocorrelation is 0.50 for the control group and 0.428 for the 
treatment group, and the sample size is more than 800, which means that ANCOVA has higher 
                                                 
29 This analysis is conducted by merging another survey’s data. Since the experiment is designed as a 
policy change at DAE, socio-economic background and other information from the SAAOs were not 
collected before the experiment. The merged data has 170 observations and is called the restricted 
sample.  
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power than DID. Therefore, an ANCOVA estimation model is used as the main specification 
to estimate the treatment effects on the performance of extension officers: 
 =  +	1	 + M2	 +  	 +	!" + #" +  …………………… (1)  
where  is the service delivery of SAAO $ in sub-district 
 at time t (after the experiment). 
F, M1, M2, and I are dummy variables for the four trea ments: Fame, Money1, Money2, and 
Inspection, respectively. βs are treatment effects to be estimated separately for each incentive. 
" presents a set of SAAO characteristics. " indicates the lagged dependent variable at 
time t-1 (before the experiment) and  is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the 
upazila agriculture office level.  
 Since there may be a heterogeneous treatment effecby SAAOs’ initial performance as 
predicted by tournament theory, interaction terms are added between treatment status and 
performance index at the baseline. To estimate the het rogeneous treatment effect of the 
experiment on performance, the following model is used:  
 =  +	1	 + M2	 +  	 + %	 × &$
−1 +	%	1 × &$
−1	 +
%	M2 × &$
−1	 + %	  × &$
−1	 + π&$
−1	 +	!" + #" + 	    
…………………… (2) 
where &"	 is an indicator variable equaling 1 if the initial performance index is below the 
median, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of interaction terms are marginal effects of each 
incentive for SAAOs with poor performance at the baseline, while those of un-interacted terms 
are marginal effects for better performance.  
The sample is divided into SAAOs in offices with hig er variance of initial performance 
and those in offices with lower variance. This tests tournament theory predictions: (1) high 
variation of initial performance among competitors leads to increase in service delivery among 
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more able officers, (2) low variation of initial performance results in no difference in effort 
level between better performers and poor performers, and (3) the treatment effects are higher 
in smaller offices than larger offices. Equation 2 were run separately for these sub-samples.  
 As explained in the previous section, the treatmen effect can be heterogeneous based 
on the SAAO preference. Therefore, different Zs, such as time discount, present bias, risk 
aversion, altruism to the poor, and public service motivation are applied by using the restricted 
sample.  
To test the robustness of the estimation results by eliminating time-invariant unobserved 
individual characteristics of SAAOs, the treatment ffects on the performance are estimated by 
the following model. 
 =  × ) +	1 × ) + M2 × ) +   × ) + 	) +  +  ……………(3)  
where ) takes value 1 if the data is after the experiment and 0 otherwise.  is the SAAOs’ 
fixed effects.   
3.4 Descriptive Statistics and Estimation Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Baseline balance  
Table 3.1 shows the baseline socio-economic characteristics (age, gender, tenure) of 
the SAAOs, the number of SAAOs in upazila agricultural office, and performance variance 
within the office. More than 80% of the SAAOs are male and have been in the position for an 
average of 15 years. The number of SAAOs in an upazila gricultural office (office size) is 
approximately 23. Except for performance variance, th se characteristics are comparable 
across the control and treatment groups. Distribution of initial performance within an office is 
larger in Inspection and Money1 than in Money2 and Fame. The number of officers in the 
offices with Inspection treatment is slightly higher than with Fame and Money2 treatments. 
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Table 3.2 shows total performance index before and after the experiment for the control 
and treatment groups. There are no differences in total performance index before the 
experiment, while after the experiment, performance is significantly higher for the treatment 
groups. Before the experiment, performance index was significantly different for Money1 and 
Money2 treatments than for Fame treatment. The increase in performance index for Inspection 
is significantly greater than for Money1, while there is no significant difference among other 
treatments.30 The last four columns compare performance index between male and female 
agents and between more and less-experienced agents. There are no differences in performance 
index before the experiment by gender or tenure. However, female and less-experienced 
extension agents increased service delivery after the experiments. This suggests that gender 
and tenure affect the impact of incentives on performance, as examined in the analysis of 
heterogeneous treatment effects by adding interaction terms with these variables. 
3.4.2 Estimation Results  
Column 1 in Table 3.3 presents the estimated effect of reatments on the total 
performance of the SAAOs. All four treatments have  positive and significant effect on the 
level of agricultural extension services provided by the agents. Inspection, Fame, Money2, and 
Money1 treatments increase the average performance by 0.49, 0.43, 0.41, and 0.38, 
respectively. Evidence indicates that these estimates re statistically different from each 
other.31  
                                                 
30 Appendix Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the performance of the treatments and control groups by each outcome 
variables for the pre-treatment and post-treatment p riod respectively. 
31 Appendix Table 3.4.1 where outcome variable is each service delivery measure show same results 
qualitatively. 
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Other columns show the heterogeneous treatment effects on performance by the initial 
poor performers, gender, and job tenure. First, the tournament theory were tested that when 
better-performing officers are not handicapped (Money2), poor performers do not improve 
performance. The results were compared from Money2 with Fame, Money1, and Inspection 
that handicap better performers. Column 2 shows that Money1 and Inspection effect 
performance significantly greater for poor performes than better performers. Since Money1 
and Inspection treatments handicap better performers, this finding is consistent with the 
tournament theory prediction. While Fame also handicaps better performers, there is no 
significant difference between poor and better-performing officers. An explanation could be 
that poor performing officers care less about future careers. In Money2, there is no significant 
difference between the poor and better performers. It is not clear why better-performing officers 
did not exert more effort when not handicapped. Among treatments, there is no significant 
difference in treatment effects on the poor performers, indicating that handicapping better 
performers is an effective method to incentivize poor performers to increase efforts.  
Columns 3 and 4 show the results for SAAOs in offices with higher and lower variances 
of initial performance,32  respectively. Even when handicapped (except Money2), better 
performers increase their efforts more than poor performers if the initial performance variation 
is high. None of the experiments indicate that the inc ntive effects on performance are greater 
for better performers than for poor performers. For Inspection, poor performers increase service 
delivery more than better performers initially. In offices with lower performance variance, 
financial incentives without handicapping better performers (Money2) increases the 
                                                 
32 Table 3.3. (columns 3-6) Shows sub-sample analyses. These sub-samples are not stratified when 
assigning treatment arms. Estimation results is interpreted with caution. 
 
73 
 
performance of better performers more than of poor erformers. Furthermore, performance by 
poor performers is enhanced the most by Inspection tha  the other treatments. 
Columns 5 and 6 show the office size (number of competitors), and the treatment effects 
are greater in larger offices, which contradicts the ournament theory prediction. In larger 
offices, Inspection has the greatest impact for the poor performers. In smaller offices, Money1 
has a greater impact on poor performers than Money2.  
Column 7 presents differences in treatment effects by gender. Money2 is significantly 
greater for male agents than female agents. Among female agents, Inspection is significantly 
higher than Money2 and Fame. Since the worst two performers are selected in Inspection, this 
suggests that selecting the worst instead of best performers should be considered an effective 
incentive mechanism, especially for female agents. 
Column 8 shows significant differences between more-experienced and less-
experienced officers for Money1 and Money2 treatments. Less-experienced officers increase 
service deliveries more than more-experienced officers. There is no differential effect between 
Fame and Inspection on performance by experience. As only monetary incentives are effective 
to improve less-experienced officer performance, thy may think their pay is too low to 
increase service delivery without additional rewards.  
 The results on heterogeneous treatment effect by officers’ preference are given in Table 
3.4. There are no heterogeneous treatment effects on performance by time discount (patience), 
altruism (to the poor), risk aversion, personality, or public service motivation.33 However, 
Fame and Inspection incentivize agents who are not present biased and can demotivate the 
                                                 
33 For these analyses, the restricted sample is used.Th  descriptive statistics and estimation results are 
given in Appendix Table 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. The description of the variables used in the restricted 
sample are given in Appendix 3.C. 
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biased agents (column 8). This result is expected, as rewards of these treatments are not paid 
immediately like Money1 or Money2.  
 In summary, the four treatments motivate extension agents to improve performance on 
average. While the results do not indicate a comparative effectiveness of financial and non-
financial rewards on performance of public sector extension agents, there are significant 
heterogeneous treatment effects on performance. The findings indicate that poor performers 
make more effort for the awards when better performers are handicapped, as tournament theory 
predicts. Regarding predictions of differential effects due to office characteristics (performance 
variation and office size), Inspection (possible punishment on worst performers) works best to 
improve poor performers in offices with higher variance and smaller number of officers. 
3.4.3 Robustness 
 
With panel data, an officer fixed effects model is applied by eliminating time-invariant 
unobserved individual characteristics of SAAOs. Appendix Table 3.3 provides the results for 
total performance index as an outcome variable and for the heterogeneous treatment effects, 
and Appendix Table 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 show each service delivery measure as outcome variables. 
The estimation results are qualitatively similar to the ANCOVA results, which confirms that 
the main results are robust.  
Six months after the experiment, a short interview was conducted with the UAOs and 
AEOs to determine the consequences of the experiment. No dissatisfaction existed among 
SAAOs regarding the experiment. No offices indicated that the experiment had negative effects 
on performance of SAAOs. Three offices introduced similar incentives to increase extension 
services. This suggests that the chapter of this dissertation supports the “do no harm” principle. 
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3.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter examined methods to improve service delivery of public agricultural 
extension officers in Bangladesh, especially for low performers. For this purpose, a randomized 
control trial was conducted. Since improving service delivery of poor-performing agents is 
more urgent than improving best-performing agents, the effects of introducing financial and 
non-financial incentives and increased monitoring (spection) were tested to determine if they 
motivate low-performing extension agents to increase performance. All treatments motivated 
poor-performing extension agents to improve performance, and increased monitoring had a 
stronger effect than financial incentives.  
There are two policy implications of this chapter. First, if the purpose of introducing 
incentives is to motivate poor-performing agents, increasing monitoring of the worst-
performing public workers is more effective than rewarding the best performers. As identifying 
and revealing the worst performers may not be acceptable in some settings and have negative 
consequences, careful application is needed. For example, this chapter found that the effect of 
inspection treatment is stronger among female extension agents than among males. If this is 
due to a strong aversion to being selected as the worst performers in the office among women, 
the number of female extension agents (and applicants) may decrease, which can prevent 
female farmers from accessing new agricultural technologies in the future. Second, clarifying 
work duties, an emphasis on short-term (monthly) rather than long-term targets (annual), and 
a frequent reward system can increase work efforts by public workers. In many developing 
countries, fiscal budgets in the agricultural sector have been declining. Introducing financial 
incentives may not be feasible. It is, therefore, important for control officers to manage 
extension workers creatively using non-financial ince tives. This also indicates that not only 
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the work morale of field workers but also the managerial abilities of control officers are key 
for improving service delivery.  
In this study, it was find that male extension workers improved performance more than 
that of the female extension agents. The likely reason might be the social norms and purdah 
system of Bangladesh where female extension workers may feel shy/embarrassed to work with 
male farmers. To increase service delivery, the possible two strategies34 are : i. to use female 
organizations for easy communication and ii. Female ext nsion workers can help female clients 
of microfinance institute. Besides these two strategies, a designated female friendly office room 
in their jurisdiction block (village) and selecting a capable contact farmers in the farmers group 
may help female extension workers to increase servic  deliver.  
To work with female group, female extension workers can form female farmers groups. 
Female extension workers can motivate female farmers group for preparing homestead 
vegetable garden.  When forming/adjust farmer’s groups, female farmers can be added in the 
group; in that case it would be easy for the female ext nsion officers to communicate with the 
female farmers. In the case of microfinance institutions, as in the village level there are many 
NGOs (microfinance institutions) worked with female c ients, female extension officers can be 
a resource persons to train up the female clients of NGOs regarding use of new crop technology. 
In the case of office room, as it is difficult for the female extension agents to reside in the 
village, an office room in the Union Parishad (village level local government) for the female 
extension agents may be useful to communicate with the farmers easily. During office hours, 
farmers can visit them in the office. Also in practice, female SAAOs mainly spend much time 
                                                 
34 To know the mechanism of how to improve the performance of female extension agents, an 
interview from one male agriculture officer and one female agriculture officer was taken. 
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preparing skilled contact farmers so that male farmers mostly communicate with the male 
contact farmers. In that case, workload reduces for female SAAOs. 
A female agriculture officer gave information that female SAAOs mainly spend much 
time to prepare a skilled contact farmers so that mle farmers mostly communicate with the 
male contact farmers. More specifically, extension workers generally work with the groups. In 
the group there must have some leader farmer (contat farmer). As female extension agents do 
not reside in villages (if posting not at won village) and cannot spend much time in the field, 
they provide more training to the contact farmers (they try to pick up right/hardworking contact 
farmers) so that people can get extension services from the contact farmers in the absence of 
SAAOs. In that case, work load are reduced for female SAAOs. In the case of using a mobile 
phone by the female extension officers to provide extension services, it is also difficult 
considering the social context. A female officer informed that when the mobile number of 
female extension officer’s become available, the young bad people called them even at night 
for an unnecessary talk. However, form the controlling office side, a key informant informed 
that the situation is changing day by day, and he found many hard-working female extension 
officers that do not feel shy/embarrassed to work with male farmers group. However, this 
context can be an interesting research topic in future.  
The limitation of this chapter is that the incentives effects on the performance of the 
SAAOs were examined only for the short-term. The comparative effectiveness of increased 
monitoring over financial and non-financial incentives found in this chapter may decay over 
time. This is an important research area to be pursued further. As previously mentioned, future 
research can also aim to improve the managerial ability of control officers in the field.  
 
78 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics on Baseline Characteristics of SAAOs and Upazila Agricultural Office by Treatment Status 
Variables Control Fame 
(T1) 
Money1 
(T2) 
Money2 
(T3) 
Inspection 
(T4)  
T1/T2 T1/T3 T1/T4 T2/T3 T2/T4 T3/T4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Male extension agents 0.88 0.83 0.82 0.86 0.83       
 (0.32) (0.37) (0.38) (0.34) (0.38) 0.82 0.33 0.88 0.24 0.70 0.40 
Job experience (Years) 14.31   15.28  14.70  13.81  15.75        
 (13.05) (2.36) (12.01) (12.71) (12.43) 0.68 0.30 0.73 0.52 0.44 0.16 
Number of SAAOs in  23.77 22.93 23.79 22.66 24.85       
 Upazila Agricultural Office (7.20) (6.37) (8.51) (6.00) (8.88) 0.32 0.70 0.03 0.18 0.27 0.01 
Performance variance within office 0.16 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.17** 0.22***       
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 
Number of SAAOs 171 152 168 159 157       
Notes: Numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate that there is a significant difference in means between treatment and 
control groups at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
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Table 3.2: Index of Service Delivery (Total Performance Index) by Treatment Status 
Variables Control 
Fame 
(T1) 
Money1 
(T2) 
Money2 
(T3) 
Inspection 
(T4)  
T1/T2 T1/T3 T1/T4 T2/T3 T2/T4 T3/T4 Male 
Agents 
Female 
Agents 
More 
experienced 
Agents 
Less 
experienced  
Agents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Pre 
treatment 
-0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.06 -0.04 
      -0.001 -0.07 -0.02 -0.003 
 (0.54) (0.52) (0.49) (0.53) (0.58) 0.05 0.01 0.37 0.56 0.33 0.13 (0.53) (0.56) (0.53) (0.54) 
Post 
treatment 
-0.33 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 
      -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.04*** 
 (0.47) (0.38) (0.42) (0.52) (0.58) 0.69 0.09 0.06 0.19 0.13 0.79 (0.53) (0.49) (0.51) (0.53) 
Difference  -0.240 0.12*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.17***       -0.01 0.08* -0.03 0.05** 
 (post – pre) (0.50) (0.45) (0.51) (0.55) (0.63) 0.08 0.29 0.44 0.54 0.03 0.10 (0.57) (0.57) (0.55) (0.59) 
Number of 
Observations 
171 152 168 159 157       684 123 437 370 
Notes: The numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate that there is a significant difference in means at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level between treatment and control groups (Column1- 5), between males and females (Column 12 – 13), and between more experienced (above median) 
and less experienced (below median) extension agents (Column 14 – 15). 
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Table 3.3: Effects of treatments on the performance (Total performance index) 
VARIABLES Base Z=1 if scored lower than median Z=1 if 
Male  
Z=1 if tenure > 
15 years  
 Full 
sample 
Full sample Higher 
variance office 
Lower 
variance office 
Larger 
office size 
Smaller 
office size 
Full 
sample 
Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fame (T1) 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.59*** 0.26*** 0.33** 0.35*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) 
Money1(T2) 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.26** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
Money2 (T3) 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.31*** 0.63*** 0.76***  0.19** 0.26* 0.33*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) 
Inspection (T4) 0.49*** 0.39*** 0.23** 0.54*** 0.63*** 0.20** 0.58*** 0.46** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.18) 
Fame (T1) ×Z   -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.14 0.02 0.09 0.00 
  (0.09) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.08) (0.00) 
Money1(T2)×Z   0.12** 0.23 0.03 0.14 0.09 -0.02 0.01** 
  (0.05) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) (0.00) 
Money2 (T3) ×Z   -0.09 0.10 -0.29** -0.18 0.00 0.20* 0.01** 
  (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10) (0.00) 
Inspection (T4) ×Z   0.20** 0.35** 0.09 0.24* 0.16 -0.11 0.00 
  (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.00) 
Z  0.06 -0.07 0.17 -0.02 0.12 -0.05 -0.01** 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.00) 
Male -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.01  -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.03) 
Job Tenure  -0.00** -0.00** -0.00* -0.00* -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Initial Performance index 0.40*** 0.46*** 0.43*** 0.53*** 0.40*** 0.50*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.13 -0.43*** -0.33*** -0.26*** -0.25** -0.21*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) 
Observations 807 807 399 408 395 412 807 807 
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Table 3.3: Effects of treatments on the performance (Total performance index) (contd.) 
VARIABLES Base Z=1 if scored lower than median Z=1 if 
Male  
Z=1 if tenure > 
15 years  
 Full 
sample 
Full sample Higher 
variance office 
Lower 
variance office 
Larger 
office size 
Smaller 
office size 
Full 
sample 
Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
R-squared 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.30 0.31 0.31 
Fame=Money1 (p-value) (0.70)        
Fame=Money2 (p-value)  (0.75)        
Fame=Inspection (p-value) (0.52)        
Money1=Money2 (p-value)  (0.57)        
Money1=Inspection (p-value) (0.42)        
Money2=Inspection (p-value) (0.68)        
Marginal effects when Z=1 or 0         
Fame1   0.39 0.42 0.36 0.45 0.28 0.42 0.35 
Fame0  0.44 0.44 0.43 0.59 0.26 0.33 0.35 
Money11   0.44 0.51 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.54 
Money10   0.32 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.35 0.39 0.30 
Money21   0.38 0.41 0.34 0.58 0.35 0.46 0.61 
Money20   0.47 0.31 0.63 0.76 0.19 0.26 0.37 
Inspection1   0.59 0.58 0.45 0.87 0.36 0.47 0.46 
Inspection 0   0.39 0.23 0.54 0.63 0.20 0.58 0.46 
Fame0=Fame1 (p value)  (0.57) (0.89) (0.54) (0.29) (0.91) (0.25) (0.25) 
Money11=Money10 (p value)  (0.02)** (0.11) (0.82) (0.23) (0.55) (0.83) (0.04)** 
Money21=Money20 (p value)  (0.34) (0.46) (0.03)** (0.14) (0.97) (0.05)* (0.05)* 
Inspection0= Inspection1 (p 
value) 
 (0.03)** (0.02)** (0.44) (0.07)* (0.22) (0.29) (0.65) 
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Table 3.3: Effects of treatments on the performance (Total performance index) (contd.) 
VARIABLES Base Z=1 if scored lower than median Z=1 if 
Male  
Z=1 if tenure > 
15 years  
 Full 
sample 
Full sample Higher 
variance office 
Lower 
variance office 
Larger 
office size 
Smaller 
office size 
Full 
sample 
Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fame1=Money11 (p-value)  (0.53) (0.43) (0.76) (0.89) (0.10) (0.56) (0.75) 
Fame1=Money21 (p-value)   (0.97) (0.93) (0.88) (0.24) (0.41) (0.64) (0.26) 
Fame1=Inspection1 (p-value)  (0.16) (0.16) (0.01)** (0.00)*** (0.37) (0.69) (0.57) 
Money11=Money21 (p-value)   (0.58) (0.32) (0.88) (0.15) (0.02)** (0.39) (0.49) 
Money11=Inspection1   (0.30) (0.47) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.39) (0.48) (0.74) 
Money21=Inspection1   (0.18) (0.09)* (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.08)* (0.92) (0.89) 
Fame0=Money10 (p-value)  (0.22) (0.12) (0.15) (0.00)*** (0.34) (0.40) (0.43) 
Fame0=Money20 (p-value)   (0.75) (0.19) (0.03)** (0.10) (0.47) (0.45) (0.92) 
Fame0=Inspection0 (p-value)  (0.74) (0.04)** (0.18) (0.75) (0.49) (0.08)* (0.52) 
Money10=Money20 (p-value)   (0.19) (0.73) (0.01)** (0.00)*** (0.10) (0.21) (0.59) 
Money10=Inspection0   (0.56) (0.61) (0.01)** (0.00)*** (0.10) (0.20) (0.32) 
Money20=Inspection0   (0.60) (0.39) (0.37) (0.18) (0.91) (0.05)* (0.53) 
Notes: F1: Fame when Z=1, F0: Fame when Z=0, M11: Money1 when Z=1, Standard errors are clustered at upazila agriculture offices in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4: Effects of treatments on the performance (Total performance index) (ANCOVA) [Restricted Sample] 
VARIABLES Z=1 if least  
patient  
Z=1 reside 
in the block 
Z=1 if 
obtained A- 
grade  
Z=PSM 
Index 
Z=Big Five 
Personality  
Z=1 if 
Altruist 
to poor 
Z=1 if Most 
Risk Averse 
Z=1 if 
Present Bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fame (T1)  0.35** 0.27** 0.43*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.32** 0.11 0.40*** 
 (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.09) 
Money1(T2)  0.51*** 0.43*** 0.46*** 0.35*** 0.36***  0.36*** 0.26*** 0.37*** 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) 
Money2 (T3)  0.40** 0.51*** 0.66*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.59*** 0.50*** 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) 
Inspection (T4)  0.37 0.40** 0.32*** 0.40*** 0.39** 0.37** 0.34** 0.50*** 
 (0.27) (0.15) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) 
Fame (T1) × Z  0.02 0.15 -0.18 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.29 -0.60*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.25) (0.18) (0.03) (0.20) (0.16) 
Money1(T2) × Z  -0.24 -0.15 -0.21 0.05 0.01 -0.00 0.15 -0.28 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (0.02) (0.16) (0.29) 
Money2 (T3) × Z  0.23 -0.04 -0.26 -0.24 -0.10 -0.00 -0.10 -0.18 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.23) (0.24) (0.03) (0.20) (0.15) 
Inspection (T4) × Z  0.05 -0.04 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.11 -0.68*** 
 (0.28) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.16) (0.03) (0.19) (0.21) 
Z 0.05 0.03  -0.13 -0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.38*** 
 (0.11) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.13) (0.02) (0.11) (0.10) 
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Table 3.4: Effects of treatments on the performance (Total performance index) (ANCOVA) [Restricted Sample] (contd.) 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Z=1 if least  
patient  
Z=1 reside 
in the block 
Z=1 if 
obtained A- 
grade  
Z=PSM 
Index 
Z=Big Five 
Personality  
Z=1 if 
Altruist 
to poor 
Z=1 if Most 
Risk Averse 
Z=1 if 
Present Bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Male -0.19** -0.20** -0.22*** -0.16* -0.16** -0.19** -0.17** -0.15* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Job Tenure  -0.00* -0.00* -0.00** -0.00* -0.00* -0.00 -0.01** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Initial Performance index 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant -0.15 -0.13 -0.19** -0.08 -0.14 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) 
Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
R-squared 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 
Notes:Other controls are Muslim, married, SSC A grade, graduate, rural school, quota privilege. Cluster tandard errors by upazila offices are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 3.1: Initial Outcome Variables 
Variables  Control Fame 
(T1) 
Money1 
(T2) 
Money2 
(T3) 
Inspection 
(T4) 
Male 
Extension 
agents 
Female 
Extension 
agents 
More 
experienced 
Extension 
Agents 
Less 
experienced 
Extension 
Agents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Number of Compost Ground prepared 4.72 4.79 5.17 4.99 4.66 4.86 4.88 4.83 4.90 
(2.62) (3.07) (3.09) (3.29) (3.04) (2.96) (3.39) (2.98) (3.08) 
Number of observations 143 152 137 147 143 612 110 381 341 
Number of FYM ground preparation 3.67 3.32 3.92 4.07 3.8 3.8 3.25** 3.83 3.68 
(2.16) (2.82) (2.86) (2.49) (2.76) (2.63) (2.57) (2.52) (2.76) 
Number of observations 171 152 155 159 170 684 123 437 370 
Number of Vermi ground prepared  1.43 1.24 1.31 1.28 1.39 1.322 1.39 1.27 1.41 
(1.43) (1.36) (1.45) (1.45) (1.32) (1.39) (1.49) (1.41) (1.39) 
Number of observations 171 152 155 159 170 684 123 437 370 
Percentage of Land used as Ideal Seedbeds 
(%) 
57.55 56.09 53.55 56.13 60.91 56.55 58.42 56.17 57.62 
(25.15) (19.81) (26.89) (21.46) (24.48) (23.98) (22.97) (23.72) (24) 
Number of observations 136 130 145 134 137 587 95 377 305 
Number of farmers used Balanced Fertilizer 162.73 139.39 182.88 196.97 136.65 164.56 153.15 167.88 156.81 
(217.52) (136.94) (156.13) (160.71) (177.61) (179.75) (152.91) (181.6) (168.84) 
Number of observations 171 125 155 120 162 623 110 400 333 
Appropriate row user for cultivation 107.33 111.45 101.95 94.05 98.64 105.76 84.80* 99.09 106.89 
(96.58) (76.64) (110.11) (66.96) (162.67) (113.80) (95.91) (112.15) (110.67) 
Number of observations 140 125 155 120 162 596 106 386 316 
Notes: Numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate that there is a significant difference in means between treatment and control 
groups at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Column1-Column 6 presents the means difference between the treatment and control group. Column 6 and 7: The Means 
difference in the service deliveries between males nd females. Column 8 & 9: The Means difference in the service deliveries between more experienced and 
less experienced extension agents. 
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Appendix Table 3.2: Post-Treatment Outcome Variables 
Variables  Control Fame 
(T1) 
Money1 
(T2) 
Money2 
(T3) 
Inspection 
(T4)  
Male 
Extension 
agents 
Female 
Extension 
agents 
More 
experienced 
Extension 
Agents 
Less 
experienced 
Extension 
Agents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Number of Compost Ground prepared 4.88 5.78*** 5.62** 5.69*** 6.08*** 5.57 5.85 5.57 5.66 
 (2.08) (3.01) (3.23) (2.89) (3.24) (2.95) (2.93) (2.78) (3.12) 
Number of observations 143 152 137 147 143 612 110 381 341 
Number of FYM ground prepared 3.93 4.93*** 5.2*** 5.70*** 4.91*** 4.95 4.76 4.80 5.07 
 (2.46) (2.40) (2.56) (3.05) (3.67) (2.92) (3.03) (2.74) (3.14) 
Number of observations 171 152 155 159 170 684 123 437 370 
Number of Vermi ground prepared 1.49 2.03*** 1.94*** 1.79* 1.79* 1.78 1.89 1.66 1.96*** 
 (1.45) (1.44) (1.52) (1.76) (1.50) (1.54) (1.49) (1.53) (1.53) 
Number of observations 171 152 155 159 170 684 123 437 370 
Percentage of Land under Ideal Seedbeds 52.45 65.29** 59.21** 64.13*** 75.60*** 62.68 67.39 62.32 64.59 
 (33.28) (21.53) (21.74) (32.01) (27.12) (28.68) (26.62) (30.00) (26.81) 
Number of observations 136 130 145 134 137 587 95 377 305 
Number of farmers used Balanced Fertilizer 148.22 184.00 223.03*** 229.6*** 214.57*** 196.76 205.96 193.83 203.29 
  (114.44) (93.41) (118.468) (140.39) (178.68) (137.78) (130.27) (136.54) (136.77) 
Number of observations 171 125 155 120 162 623 110 400 333 
Appropriate row user for cultivation 109.36 172.78*** 178.96*** 182.96*** 219.28*** 175.66 164.51 165.93 183.85* 
 (120.80) (84.85) (58.261) (127.102) (175.87) (131.13) (99.23) (118.47) (135.92) 
Number of observations 140 125 155 120 162 596 106 386 316 
Notes: Numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate that there is a significant difference in means between treatment and 
control groups at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Column1-Column 5 represents the means difference of the service deliveries between the treatment and control 
group. Column 6 and 7: The means difference in the service deliveries between males and females. Column 8 & 9: The Means difference of the service 
deliveries between more experienced and less experienc d extension agents.
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Appendix Table 3.3: Effects of treatments on the performance (Total performance index) (Officer Fixed Effects Model) 
VARIABLES Base Z=1 if scored 
lower than 
median 
Z=1 if Male 
extension 
agents 
Z =1 if tenure<15 Z=Initial 
performance 
score 
Z=Tenure  Z=Initial 
Performance 
variance by 
office 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Fame (T1) × Post 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.42** 0.42** 0.40*** 0.50*** -0.27 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.10) (0.17) (0.33) 
Money1(T2) × Post 0.36*** 0.28** 0.28* 0.41** 0.38**  0.24* -0.32 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.14) (0.26) 
Money2 (T3) × Post 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.16 0.39** 0.43*** 0.37** -0.03 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.11) (0.15) (0.32) 
Inspection (T4) × Post 0.50*** 0.37** 0.61*** 0.44** 0.49*** 0.59*** 0.13 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.19) (0.31) 
Fame (T1) × Z × Post  -0.08 -0.24** -0.36*** -0.07 -0.00 4.86** 
  (0.06) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.01) (2.32) 
Money1(T2) × Z × Post  0.15*** 0.03 0.07 -0.12 0.01* 3.95** 
  (0.04) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.00) (1.55) 
Money2 (T3) × Z × Post  -0.07 0.09 -0.13 0.00 0.00 2.72 
  (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.13) (0.00) (1.92) 
Inspection (T4) × Z × Post  0.28** 0.27* -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 2.55 
  (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.20) (0.01) (1.71) 
Post -0.33*** -0.52*** -0.14 0.13 -0.34*** -0.30*** 0.15 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.22) 
Z × Post   0.39*** -0.11 0.06 -0.56*** -0.00 -3.06** 
  (0.03) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.00) (1.39) 
Constant -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 
R-squared 0.10 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.42 0.11 0.13 
Notes: Cluster standard errors by upazila offices ar  in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 3.4.1: Standardized Service Delivery Measure (ANCOVA models) 
VARIABLES Compost ground 
preparation.  
FYM ground 
preparation  
Vermi 
ground 
preparation  
Appropriate 
fertilizer user 
Appropriate 
row user 
Ideal seedbeds 
preparation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fame 0.29* 0.40***  0.44** 0.30* 0.49***  0.48 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) (0.34) 
Money1 0.19 0.39** 0.35** 0.51***  0.57***  0.30 
 (0.21) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.09) (0.32) 
Money2 0.24 0.54*** 0.26 0.54** 0.61*** 0.45 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.37) 
Inspection 0.41* 0.32 0.22 0.53** 0.89*** 0.76* 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.18) (0.24) (0.30) (0.40) 
Male -0.09 -0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.08 -0.07 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) 
Job Tenure 0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Initial outcome variables 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.55*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.42*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant -0.16 -0.26* -0.16 -0.28** -0.56*** -0.26 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.30) 
Observations 722 807 807 733 702 682 
R-squared 0.16 0.20 0.33 0.13 0.16 0.26 
Fame=Money1 (p-value) 0.64 0.97 0.61 0.22 0.58 0.20 
Fame=Money2(p-value) 0.78 0.42 0.31 0.26 0.62 0.88 
Fame =Inspection (p-value) 0.64 0.73 0.26 0.33 0.21 0.30 
Money1=Money2 (p-value) 0.83 0.45 0.62 0.91 0.84 0.47 
Money1=Inspection (p-value) 0.45 0.77 0.52 0.94 0.29 0.07 
Money2 =Inspection (p-value) 0.52 0.43 0.85 0.97 0.43 0.29 
Notes:***, **, and * indicate that there is a significant difference in means between treatment and control groups at 1, 5% and 10% level. The 
standard error is clustered at sub-district level ar  in parenthesis. Note: Index for compost ground/FYM ground/Vermi ground preparation: 
Standardized value of Number of compost grounds/FYM ground, Vermi ground prepared by the farmers with the consultation of SAAO. Index for 
ideal seedbeds preparation: Standardized value of prcentage of total land used as ideal seedbeds by the farmer with the motivation from SAAO. 
Index for appropriate fertilizer use: Standardized value of the number of farmers used appropriate fertiliz r with the consultation of SAAO. Index 
for appropriate row user: Standardized value of the number of farmers maintain appropriate row for rice cultivation with the consultation of SAAO.  
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Appendix Table 3.4.2: Standardized Service Delivery Measure (Officer Fixed Effect models) 
VARIABLES Compost ground 
preparation.  
FYM ground 
preparation  
Vermi 
ground 
preparation  
Appropriate 
fertilizer user 
Appropriate 
row user 
Ideal seedbeds 
preparation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fame × Post 0.27 0.47** 0.50***  0.37 0.48** 0.54 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.32) (0.21) (0.32) 
Money1 × Post 0.10 0.36* 0.39** 0.35 0.60***  0.41 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.17) (0.34) (0.21) (0.30) 
Money2 × Post 0.18 0.48** 0.31** 0.30 0.70*** 0.51 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.14) (0.33) (0.22) (0.34) 
Inspection × Post 0.42* 0.30 0.23 0.58 0.95*** 0.75** 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.14) (0.37) (0.32) (0.34) 
Post 0.05 0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.02 -0.19 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.31) (0.16) (0.28) 
Constant -0.12***  -0.20***  -0.16***  -0.11** -0.29***  -0.12***  
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Observations 1,444 1,614 1,614 1,466 1,404 1,364 
R-squared 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.26 0.10 
Fame=Money1 (p-value) 0.45 0.55 0.60 0.88 0.51 0.51 
Fame=Money2(p-value) 0.63 0.97 0.29 0.63 0.28 0.89 
Fame =Inspection (p-value) 0.77 0.58 0.65 0.81 0.63 0.67 
Money1=Money2 (p-value) 0.54 0.42 0.14 0.38 0.13 0.43 
Money1=Inspection (p-value) 0.28 0.78 0.37 0.37 0.26 0.15 
Money2 =Inspection (p-value) 0.38 0.44 0.58 0.24 0.41 0.39 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that there is a significant difference in means between treatment and control groups at 1, 5% and 10% level. The 
standard error is clustered at sub-district level ar  in parenthesis. Note: Index for compost ground/FYM ground/Vermi ground preparation: 
Standardized value of Number of compost grounds/FYM ground, Vermi ground prepared by the farmers with the consultation of SAAO. Index for 
ideal seedbeds preparation: Standardized value of prcentage of total land used as ideal seedbeds by the farmer with the motivation from SAAO. 
Index for appropriate fertilizer use: Standardized value of the number of farmers used appropriate fertiliz r with the consultation of SAAO. Index 
for appropriate row user: Standardized value of the number of farmers maintain appropriate row for rice cultivation with the consultation of SAAOs.
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Appendix Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics (Restricted Sample) 
Variables  Control Fame Money1 Money2 Inspection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pre-treatment performance index -0.053 -0.250*  0.061 0.183** -6.740 
 
(0.485) (0.485 ) (0.514) (0.463) (0.637) 
Post treatment Performance Index -0.337 0.082*** 0.069*** 0.282*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.462) (0.631) (0.387) (0.571) (0.631) 
Tenure 9.919 16.69** 13.75 15.25* 16.69** 
 
(11.651) (12.939) (11.267) (12.593) (12.939) 
Male 0.757 0.848 0.778 0.844 0.848 
 
(0.435) (0.364) (0.422) (0.369) (0.364) 
Islam 0.784 0.697 0.750 0.688 0.697 
 
(0.417) (0.467) (0.439) (0.471) (0.467) 
Married 0.568 0.636 0.75 0.563 0.636 
 
(0.502) (0.489) (0.439) (0.504) (0.489) 
=1 if obtained A- grade  0.514 0.606 0.500 0.656 0.606 
 
(0.507) (0.496) (0.507) (0.483) (0.496) 
=1 if Graduate  0.189 0.121 0.250 0.156 0.121 
 
(0.397) (0.331) (0.439) (0.369) (0.331) 
=if raised in village  0.892 0.848 0.917 0.875 0.848 
 
(0.315) (0.364) (0.280) (0.336) (0.364) 
=1 if quota privileged  0.243 0.121 0.139 0.188 0.121 
 
(0.435) (0.331) (0.351) (0.397) (0.331) 
PSM Index 0.104 -0.088 0.012 -0.009 -0.088 
 
(0.458) (0.530) (0.478) (0.437) (0.530) 
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Appendix Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics (Restricted Sample) (contd.) 
Variables  Control Fame Money1 Money2 Inspection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Big five Index -0.015 0.101 -0.025 -0.044 0.101 
 
(0.487) (0.486) (0.481) (0.484) (0.486) 
=1 if least patient  0.622 0.697 0.583 0.531 0.697 
 
(0.492) (0.467) (0.500) (0.507) (0.467) 
Altruism  5.270 4.455 4.222 4.688 4.455 
 
(2.815) (3.624) (3.145) (3.095) (3.624) 
=1 if present bias 0.054 0.242** 0.083 0.156 0.242** 
 
(0.229) (0.435) (0.280) (0.369) (0.435) 
=1 if most risk averse  0.784 0.667 0.778 0.813 0.667 
 
(0.417) (0.479) (0.422) (0.397) (0.479) 
=if reside in block area 0.405 0.455 0.639** 0.438 0.455 
 
(0.498) (0.506) (0.487) (0.504) (0.506) 
Number of Observations 37 32 36 32 33 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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        Appendix Table 3.6: Effects of treatments on the performance (Total performance 
index, TPI) (ANCOVA) [Restricted Sample] 
VARIABLES Base Z=1 if 
scored 
lower 
than 
median 
Z=1 if 
Male 
extension 
agents 
Z =1 if 
tenure<15 
Z= 
Initial 
performance 
score 
Z=tenure  Z=Initial 
Performance 
variance by 
office 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Fame (T1)  0.36*** 0.33** 0.42** 0.30** 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) 
Money1(T2)  0.36*** 0.24* 0.40*** 0.37** 0.38*** 0.30** 0.48*** 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) 
Money2 (T3)  0.52*** 0.52*** 0.57** 0.65*** 0.48*** 0.35* 0.81*** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15) (0.20) (0.20) 
Inspection 
(T4)  
0.42** 0.37** 0.44*** 0.39* 0.42*** 0.51** 0.30 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) 
Fame× Z   0.12 -0.07 0.15 -0.14 0.00 0.33 
  (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.01) (1.12) 
Money1 × Z   0.26* -0.05 -0.02 -0.27 0.01 -0.69 
  (0.13) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.01) (0.61) 
Money2 × Z   -0.05 -0.06 -0.23 0.21 0.01 -1.64 
  (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.01) (0.98) 
Inspection ×Z   0.11 -0.03 0.09 0.12 -0.00 0.29 
  (0.18) (0.25) (0.24) (0.17) (0.01) (0.61) 
Z  0.10  -0.14   0.92 
  (0.10)  (0.16)   (0.58) 
Male -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Job Tenure  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Initial TPI 0.51*** 0.61*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.52***  0.52*** 0.45*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) 
Constant -0.24** -
0.29*** 
-0.27** -0.14 -0.25** -0.23** -0.43*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) 
Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
R-squared 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.48 
Notes: Cluster standard errors by upazila offices ar  in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Appendix 3.A: Experiment Scripts 
Script for Fame treatment 
There is pressure from higher authorities for every sub-assistant agriculture officer 
(SAAO) to achieve their monthly target. Therefore, starting next month, with instructions 
from the Deputy Director (DD), we will select the two best SAAOs who increase their 
achievement rate the most. After selecting them, I will send a letter to the DD with their 
names, along with other reports. For example, if Mr. X achieved 90% in December and 
100% in January, and Mr. Y achieved 60% in December and 70% in January, then the 
percentage increase in target achievement for Mr. X and Mr. Y is 100×10/90=11% and 
100×10/60=17%, respectively. Thus, Mr. Y will be considered a better performer than 
Mr. X. This means agents who performed poorly in the initial period have the potential 
to become the highest achievers.  
Please do not over-report service deliveries. If you d  so, a showcause letter will be issued. 
I will confirm your service deliveries in the field. 
Script for Money1 treatment 
There is pressure from higher authorities for every sub-assistant agriculture officer 
(SAAO) to achieve the target monthly. Therefore, starting next month with instructions 
from the Deputy Director (DD), we will select the two best SAAOs who increased their 
achievement rate most. To increase service delivery, a foreign university has decided to 
offer a monetary reward to the two best achievers. The best achiever will get 3,000 BDT, 
and the second-best achiever will get 1,000 BDT. I will select the two best SAAOs who 
increase their achievement most. For example, if Mr. X achieved 90% in December and 
100% in January and Mr. Y achieved 60% in December and 70% in January, then the 
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percentage increase in target achievement for Mr. X and Mr. Y is 100×10/90=11% and 
100×10/60=17%, respectively. Mr. Y will be considered a better performer than Mr. X. 
This means agents who performed poorly in the initial period have the potential to become 
the best achievers.  
Please do not over-report service deliveries. If you d  so, a showcause letter will 
be issued. I will confirm your service deliveries in the field. 
Script for Money2 treatment 
There is a pressure from higher authorities for every sub-assistant agriculture officer 
(SAAO) to achieve the monthly target monthly. Beginning next month, according to an 
instruction from the Deputy Director (DD), we will select the two best SAAOs. To 
increase service delivery, a foreign university has decided to offer money to the two best 
achievers. I will select the two best SAAOs based on increased percentage of achievement. 
For example, Mr. X achieved 90% in December and 100% in January. Mr. Y achieved 
60% in December and 70% in January. Mr. X will be considered a better performer than 
Mr. Y. The best achiever will get 3,000 BDT, and the second best achiever will get 1,000 
BDT.  
Please do not over-report service deliveries. If you d  so, a showcause letter will be issued. 
I will confirm your service deliveries in the field. 
Script for Inspection treatment 
There is a pressure from higher authorities for every sub-assistant agriculture officer 
(SAAO) to achieve their monthly target. Beginning next month, according to an 
instruction from the Deputy Director (DD), I will prepare a list of SAAOs ranked by 
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achievement rate. I will select the worst two performers based on who increased their 
achievement rate the least and send their names to the DD. For example, if Mr. X achieved 
90% in December and 100% in January, and Mr. Y achieved 60% in December and 70% 
in January, then the percentage increase in the targ t chievement for Mr. X and Mr. Y is 
100×10/90=11% and 100×10/60=17%, respectively. Mr. Y will be considered a better 
performer than Mr. X. This means agents who performed poorly in the initial period have 
the potential to become the best achievers.  
Please do not over-report service deliveries. If you d  so, a showcause letter will 
be issued. I will confirm your service deliveries in the field. 
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Appendix 3.B: Variables 
For the data analysis, the following variables were us d:  
 Age of SAAOs: Calculated based on self-reported birthdates of respondents. 
 Experience as SAAOs: Number of years working in current job. 
 Female: =1 if SAAOs are female, 0 otherwise. 
 Young: =1 if the age of the SAAOs is lower than the m dian age, 0 otherwise. 
 Office size: Number of SAAOs in an upazila agricultural office. 
 Initial poor performers: =1 if the SAAOs scored below the median score in the 
initial performance index. 
 Initial performance distribution by office: Variance of the initial SAAOs’ 
performance index in each upazila agricultural office.  
 
Service delivery (performance) measures 
Performance of SAAOs is a measure of the number of service deliveries in one 
month prior (2nd week of December 2017 to 1st week of January 2018)35 and after the 
experiment (2nd week of January 2018 to 1st week of February 2018). In particular, the 
performance of SAAOs is measured by the number of farmers to whom they provided 
specific extension services before and after the reform.  According to a national-level 
survey (ASIRP, 2003), around 90% of farmers who received advice from SAAOs adopted 
the advice provided.36 The experiment took place in the middle of the Rabi season when 
                                                 
35 Compost and vermicompost ground preparation occur year round. For these outcome variables, 
the service deliveries in the month before and after th  treatment were compared. In the case of 
other outcome variables, such as appropriate fertiliz r user, ideal seedbed preparation, and 
appropriate row user, service deliveries for those services seasonally were compared. The service 
deliveries in two seasons were compared, such as Khrip-2 (late summer season) (before the 
experiment) and Rabi (winter season) (after the treatm nt). 
36 Nippard (2014) found that that more than 90% of farmers trust the advice of public sector 
extension agents. 
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SAAOs provide six main agricultural extension services: (i) compost ground (sites) 
preparation; (ii) FYM grounds (sites) preparation; (iii) vermicompost grounds (sites) 
preparation; (iv) rice cultivation with appropriate fertilizer use; (v) rice cultivation with 
the appropriate row; (vi) ideal seedbeds preparation for rice cultivation. Outcome 
variables are the numbers of farmers who adopted thse practices with the consultation 
of SAAOs. However, the observation numbers are different for some outcome variables 
(compost ground preparation, ideal seedbeds preparation, ppropriate fertilizer use, and 
appropriate row user). Though six main services were provided in all agriculture offices 
during the experiment, some upazila agriculture offices do not provide all extension 
services. For example, upazila agriculture offices Amtali, Harinakundu, Laxmipur sadar, 
and Satkhira Sadar do not prepare or emphasize compost ground preparation. Therefore, 
85 observations the compost ground data from these upazilas were excluded.37 During 
the experiment, data for job tenure, age, and gender of xtension officers was collected. 
To ensure a formal and natural experiment, other socio-economic data of the officers were 
not collected.  
 Some services are more easily delivered than others; therefore, each extension 
service was standardized by mean and standard deviation, nd an overall performance 
measure was constructed by taking an average of the standardized values of each service. 
This is the Total Performance Index (TPI), which was c lculated for the initial and the 
                                                 
37 Preparing ideal seedbeds is not popular and are not provided by SAAOs in some upazilas. 
Therefore, 125 observation for ideal seedbeds were excluded from these upazilas: Betagi, 
Khoksha, Kumerkhali, Madaripur Sadar, Mirzaganj, Muksedpur, and Patharghata. Similarly, 
appropriate fertilizer and appropriate row user data from Amtali, Jhikorgacha, Betagi, and Kushtia 
Sadar were excluded. In these upazilas, rice plants were not mature enough in the seedbeds, and 
therefore data for appropriate fertilizer and approriate row user during cultivation was not 
possible to collect. As the Sharsha upazila agriculture office does not maintain cultivation in 
appropriate row, data of appropriate row user were excluded. Finally, 74 and 105 observations 
from these upazilas for appropriate fertilizer and row user were excluded, respectively.  
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post-treatment periods. In the third chapter, TPI and Index of Service Delivery are used 
as synonyms. 
Compost:  
In Bangladesh, farmers make compost by mixing cow dung with crop residue, water 
hyacinth, dry leaves, vegetables and fruit peels, and weeds. The decomposition process 
takes six to nine weeks, and compost can be stored f  three to six months. During land 
preparation, compost is applied to enhance the soil (Agriculture Learning, 2018). The 
measurement of service delivery on compost use is the number of farmers SAAOs 
motivated to prepare compost in the last month.  
Farmyard Manure (FYM):  
Farmyard manure refers to the decomposed mixture of animal manure, urine, bedding 
material, fodder residue, and other organic materials such as crops residue and waste. It 
has high organic content, which increases water holding capacity and improves friable 
soil structures (FAO, 2012). The application of partially decomposed manure can increase 
pests. The measurement of service delivery on FYM is the number of farmers SAAOs 
motivated to prepare FYM in the last month.  
Vermicompost:  
Vermicompost is produced using earthworms for composting organic residues and is a 
widely used organic fertilizer (Agriculture Learning, 2018). The duration of the 
decomposition process is shorter, and the loss of nutrie ts during the process is smaller 
than that of traditional compost (Agriculture Learning, 2018). The measurement of 
service delivery on vermicompost is the number of farmers SAAOs motivated to prepare 
vermicompost in the last month.  
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Ideal Seedbeds:  
There are several standards for seedbeds to be considered ideal in Bangladesh. The width 
of the seedbed should be 1.0-3.5 feet, but the length can vary. There must be a 25-30 cm 
drainage between seedbeds. In every square meter, 80-100 grams of seeds must be sowed 
evenly (AIS, 2015). Frequent weeding should be conducted. The measurement of service 
delivery on ideal seedbeds is the percentage of the to al land used as an ideal seedbed in 
the current season (Rabi Season) (post-treatment period) and in the previous Kharip-2 
season (mid-July to mid-November 2018) for the baseline. Construction and management 
of seedbeds are only at the beginning of each cropping season.  
Appropriate Fertilizer use for cultivation:  
Farmers who used fertilizer after consulting with SAAOs regarding types and quantity of 
fertilizers are considered appropriate fertilizer users. The measurement of service delivery 
on appropriate fertilizer use is the number of appro riate fertilizer farmers during the Rabi 
season (post-treatment period) and in the previous Kharip-2 season (mid-July to mid-
November 2018) for baseline. Fertilizer application is done at the beginning and middle 
of each cropping season. 
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Appropriate Transplanting:  
Appropriate transplanting in rice cultivation is defin d by seedlings transplanted in a row 
with space of 25x15 cm between rows (AIS, 2015). The measurement of service delivery 
of appropriate transplanting is the number of approriate transplanting farmers during the 
Rabi season (post-treatment period) and in the Kharip-2 season (mid-July to mid-
November 2018) for the baseline. Transplanting is conducted only at the beginning of 
each cropping season. 
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Appendix 3.C: Variables for Analyses using Restricted Sample 
For data analysis, the following variables were used: 
 Married: 1=married, 0 otherwise. 
 Religion (Islam): 1=Muslim 
 Raised in an urban area: 1=raised in the district and capital area up to secondary 
education. 
 A-grade: 1=grade A- (60-70% marks) in the secondary school certificate exam. 
 Quota Privilege: See Appendix 2.A. 
 Big-Five Personality Index: See Appendix 2.A. 
 PSM index: See Appendix 2.A. 
 Patience and Present Bias: See Appendix 2.A 
 Most-risk averse: See Appendix 2.A  
 Altruism: See Appendix 2.A.  
 Reside in block area: Equals 1 if the SAAOs reside in their jurisdictional village, 
0 otherwise. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
4.1 Conclusion and Policy implications 
Considering incentives as an important policy to increase performance of workers, 
and to recruit and select higher quality officers in public sector, two case studies were 
documented in this dissertation. In the first case, a survey was conducted on the civil 
service applicants and incumbent civil service officers of Bangladesh. In particular, using 
survey data on the civil service applicants and officers, we examined whether the 2015 
pay scale reform attracted higher quality officers in terms of education, previous income, 
personality, and Public Service Motivation (PSM) in the BCS. In the second case, a 
Randomized Control Trial (RTC) were conducted to test he effectiveness of financial 
and non-financial incentives, and increased monitori g for improving performance of 
incumbent agriculture extension officers. In both cases, this dissertation found that 
incentives were effective for attracting highly qualified applicants as well as civil service 
officers in the BCS, and for improving the performance of public agriculture sector 
frontline workers. This dissertation findings suggest that incentives are an important 
policy in order to improve the public sector worker’s quality and motivation in developing 
countries like Bangladesh. The policymakers of Bangl desh and other developing 
countries should consider incentives as a means of improving the efficiency of their public 
sector. In the subsequent sections, the findings of the two case studies has been 
summarized along with policy implications. 
 In Chapter two, the estimation results show that te pay scale reform does not 
increase the average quality of the applicants but applicants in the post-reform cohort 
were more pro-socially motivated than applicants in the pre-reform cohort. In the case of 
incumbent civil service officers, the chapter 2 finds that post-reform BCS officers have 
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higher educational quality than pre-reform officers and higher PSM. Compared to pre-
reform BCS officers, they are also more motivated to public service, more altruistic to the 
poor, and have higher social preferences. These findings are different from those of 
previous studies examining the effect of incentives on the quality and motivation of 
community-level public sector workers. Findings of the chapter two of this dissertation 
also suggest that the effect of financial incentives on the quality and motivation of the 
applicant pool of public sector jobs depends on the context.  
Chapter 2 again did not examine the effect of the reform on the performance of 
the civil service. The fact that better quality indivi uals were joined to BCS at the 
recruitment stage does not guarantee their long-term improvement in performance, as 
Bertrand et al. (2018) find in the context of the Indian elite civil service, where those with 
lower promotion prospects are less motivated and inefficient in providing public service. 
As the promotion prospect in BCS is highly politicized and corrupt and 84% of our 
sampled BCS officers expressed concerns about promoti n, the government may need to 
introduce promotion criteria not based on lobbying a d political choices, so that officers 
are motivated to provide public service until retirment. This can also have a positive 
effect on recruiting better-quality individuals for the civil service as also found in Morgan 
et al. (2012). 
Besides, the pay scale reform may have had negative consequences on the public 
sector too. After the pay scale reform, a trend wasobserved: highly qualified applicants 
(even doctors, engineers, and professionals) showed littl  or no interest in private-sector 
jobs; even high salaried applicants have been leaving their private-sector jobs for BCS 
jobs, an observation confirmed in the second chapter of this dissertation. The government 
is the largest employer in the economy, but the contribution of the private sector to the 
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development of the country is larger than that of the government sector (Islam, 2016). For 
the sake of the development of the country, a major part of the talent of the youth should 
be used for the development of the private sector, especially for the productive and service 
sectors (Islam 2017). As Islam (2016) rightly pointed out, it is good to build a strong and 
capable public sector human capital when a country is in the developing stage through 
incentives, but in the long run, this may hamper private sector development. Policymakers 
must consider this possibility in advance, so that e public sector wage is not too high 
compared with private sector jobs.  
In the Chapter three, the estimation results show that financial, non-financial 
incentives and increased monitoring were effective for increasing the overall performance 
of the public agricultural extension agents. The estimation results also show the 
significant positive effects of the treatments on the performance of female and young 
extension agents, pre-treatment performance of the extension agents, and pre-treatment 
performance distribution variation by office. Chapter hree also find that almost all the 
treatments were effective for motivating the low-ability extension agents to increase their 
performance, and increased monitoring had a stronge effect than the financial incentives. 
The findings of the chapter 3 can help the agricultura  policymakers of developing 
countries to improve the public extension services by considering incentives as an 
important policy. As many of the developing countries suffer from the poor performance 
of the public extension agents, evidence from the third chapter of this dissertation 
suggests that monitoring based on the poor performance can be an effective way of 
activating poor performing extension agents.  
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The evidence of chapter 3 also suggests that increased monitoring can be an 
effective tool to improve performance of the frontline agriculture extension workers. 
Although Monitoring is sometimes costly, chapter 3’s findings do not suggest more 
inspection in terms of monitoring, rather controlling office can inspect based on the level 
of performance to warn poor-performing agents. This may reduce burden of more and 
regular inspection to the performance of SAAOs. During the survey, it was found that 
most of the Upazila agriculture officers do not follow regular inspection schedule.  
Finally, effective service delivery is important for the public sector, thereby to 
improve public sector service delivery the governmet sometimes offer incentives for 
motivating its agents to work hard. In particular, offering incentives are a potential 
strategy that government can use to improve performance of the workers (effort channel) 
and to recruit better quality workers (selection channel). In the context of Bangladesh 
Public Sector, it was found in chapter 2 that financi l incentives help to attract better 
quality officers (selection channel) in Bangladesh Civil Service. The chapter 3 also finds 
that financial, non-financial incentives and increas d monitoring was effective to improve 
performance (effort channel) of the agricultural extension workers. It is expected that this 
research will help policy makers of developing countries (at least in the context of 
Bangladesh) to improve their public sector through effort and selection channel. 
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